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The Academy of ProgramlProject and Engineering Leadership (APPEL) and 
ASKMagazine help NASA managers and project teams accomplish today's missions 
and meet tomorrow's challenges by sponsoring knowledge-sharing events and 
publications, providing performance enhancement services and tools, supporting 
career development programs, and creating opportunities for project management 
and engineering collaboration with universities, professional associations, industry 
partners, and other government agencies. 
ASK Magazine grew out of the previous academy, the Academy of ProgramIProject 
Leadership, and its Knowledge Sharing Initiative, designed for programlproject 
managers to share best practices and lessons learned with fellow practitioners across 
the Agency. Reflecting APPEL's new responsibility for engineering development 
and the challenges of NASA's new mission, ASK includes articles that explore 
engineering achievements as well as insight into broader issues of organizational 
knowledge, learning, and collaboration. We at APPEL Knowledge Sharing believe 
that stories recounting the real-life experiences of practitioners communicate 
important practical wisdom. By telling their stories, NASA managers, scientists, and 
engineers share valuable experience-based knowledge and foster a community of 
reflective practitioners. The stories that appear in ASK are written by the "best of 
the best" project managers and engineers, primarily from NASA, but also from other 
government agencies, academia, and industry. Who better than a project manager or 
engineer to help a colleague address a critical issue on a project? Big projects, small 
projects-they're all here in ASK 
You can help ASKprovide the stories you need and want by letting our editors know 
what you think about what you read here and by sharing your own stories. To submit 
stories or ask questions about editorial policy, contact Don Cohen, Managing Editor, 
doncohen@rcn.com, 781-860-5270. 
For inquiries about APPEL Knowledge Sharing programs and products, please contact 
the Knowledge Sharing Project Manager, Rosie Robinson, ASRC Management Services, 
6303 Ivy Lane, Suite 130, Greenbelt, MD 20770; rosie.robinson@asrcms.com; 
301-837-9067. 
To subscribe to ASK, please send your full name and preferred mailing address 
(including mail stop, if applicable) to ASKmagazine@asrcms.com. 
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In This Issue 
The success of complex project work depends on good 
communication. That's such an obvious truth, it may hardly 
seem worth mentioning: if the many people building a 
spacecraft or pursuing some other ambitious goal can't 
understand one another and coordinate their efforts, the 
project will fail. But knowing that communication matters 
doesn't tell you how it works. Several articles here take a 
close look at both the what and how of communication. 
One way peoplecommunicate is through story. "The Power 
of Story" notes that stories excel at communicating norms, 
values, relationships, and emotions-essential elements of 
teamwork and project success that cannot be evoked by the 
content or language of technical documents. Stories also 
draw listeners into the action, offering a vicarious experience 
of what life or work is really like, as opposed to the theorist's 
description of what it should be like. Because stories are 
such potent communicators, we decided to interview a 
master storyteller in this issue of ASK rather than a manager, 
engineer, or scientist directly involved in the space program. 
One surprising point storyteller Jay O'Callahan makes is that, 
the listener plays an active, creative role in storytelling: that 
effective listening is also a skill. 
The importance of listening is implicit in the argument of 
Wayne Hale's "Leading Your Leaders." Hale writes about how 
and what people doing hands-on work should communicate 
to the leaders who make decisions about that work. He 
stresses the importance of clarity, of providing context and 
describing solutions as well as problems. But the leaders 
being led by that information have an essential role to play 
as open, intelligent listeners. Real communication is always 
a partnership between speakers and listeners. Other articles 
that are less directly about communication-"Best Buy: 
Planning for Disaster," "The Project Manager Who Saved His 
Country," and "Dawn: Cooperation, Not Control"-all touch 
on the importance of listening and being open to learning 
from what you hear. 
Innovation is another of this issue's themes. The innovation 
articles hinge on a different kind of "listeningw-that is, paying 
attention to what experimentation and failure tell you. Peter 
Homer won NASA's Astronaut Glove Challenge by quickly 
turning dozens of ideas into prototype glove fingers and 
learning something from each failure that pointed the way to 
a better idea. Homer considers awareness a vital contributor 
to innovation. His solitary achievement is the exception rather 
than the rule. As Ed Hoffman says in his "From the APPEL 
Director" column, most innovation arises from groups whose 
members communicate well, combining their "old" ideas to 
make something new. 
Philip Weber's "The Summer of Hydrogen" and William 
Pomerantz's "Learning from Space Entrepreneurs" offer 
other examples of learning from trial and error or rapid 
prototyping-of listening to experience. Both articles also 
affirm the importance of communication among the people 
striving to build something new or solve a difficult problem. 
The Kennedy ground crew eventually fixed the Space Shuttle's 
hydrogen leak by working closely with the contractor who 
built the faulty seal. The space entrepreneurs competing for 
X PRIZE Foundation prizes frequently share experiences and 
information, recognizing that they get as much as they give 
from that open conversation. There's also the fact that they 
are too passionate about their work to keep quiet about it. 
Don Cohen 
Managing Editor 
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From the APPEL ~iiector 
Innovation: Burning Bridges or Building Them? 
BY ED HOFFMAN 
'7 can only talk about 
what hm moved me or 
intrz@ed me. I can't 
real& be olrjective here." 
-Martin Scorsese, from 
A Personal Journq with 
Martin Scorsese Through 
American Movies 
I love movies. What does that have to do with ASK 
and NASA? My love of movies recently led me to 
purchase a DVD set called A PersonalJourney with 
Martin Scorsese Through American Movies. Scorsese 
is a great director. Among his forty films are Tnxi 
Driver, Raging Bull, Goodfellas, and The Departed. 
Buying and watching the documentary crystallized 
for me concepts about innovation-an issue that is 
critically important to NASA and this magazine. 
Until now, I accepted the notion that 
innovation was about destruction: breaking away 
from the past, blowing up the old, changing 
everything Burn your ships when you get to a 
new place so there's no going back. (According to 
legend, Spaniard Hernindo Cortts did that on the 
coast of Mexico to make retreat impossible.) 
I think that view is wrong. In reality, innovation 
brings the old and new together, both in what it 
creates and how the creative process happens. It 
doesn't burn bridges; it builds them. 
I first saw the Scorsese documentary years ago 
when I checked out a beaten-up set of VHS tapes 
from my local library. I loved every minute of it. 
Scorsese communicated his passion and devotion 
to great movies and vividly evoked the challenge 
movie artists face in bringing their unique visions 
to the screen. Those individual visions can only be 
made real through the competence and cooperation 
of a whole community of reflective practitioners. 
And however brilliant and "new" they may be, 
they will only matter to audiences if they connect 
with fundamental human experiences and feelings 
that are very old. 
I never expected to see this documentary 
again. But after watching the recent Kennedy 
Center Honors that included Scorsese, I typed 
"Martin Scorsese" into Amazon's search field and 
was ecstatic to find the documentary had been put 
on DVD in 2000. 
The relatively new experience of online 
purchasing is amazing. The Amazon site offers 
reviews, search capabilities, communities, buying 
options, and links to other sites. It is successful not 
only because of shopping convenience but because 
its technology makes a large, like-minded social 
community instantly accessible. It helps you do 
old things-buy something you want and connect 
with other people-in a new way. 
By definition, innovation means something 
new, but the best innovations of the Internet- 
Google, Amazon, eBay, Second Life-are powerful 
because they build on exactly the things that are 
most useful and valuable from the past. Instead of 
the new overthrowing the old, the new strengthens 
and extends proven ideas and capabilities. The ease 
and power of its social connections has made the 
Internet a ubiquitous tool, as common as driving a car 
or turning on the television. From games to shopping 
to information exchange to influence networks, it 
has wrought a tremendous transformation thanks 
especially to the vast potential for collaboration it 
has opened up. The Internet is an innovation in 
how we collaborate that I believe will lead to even 
greater innovation. 
So both Scorsese's understanding of how great 
movies are made and my experience of buying the 
DVDs on which he shared his wisdom tell me that 
community is an essential part of innovation. Humans 
have always needed to communicate, collaborate, 
and share with other humans, and great innovations 
spring from our communal experience. Innovation is 
more about connection than destruction. I 

Ground crew veterans at Kennedy Space Center still talk about what they call "the summer of 
hydrogen"-the long, frustrating months in 1990 when the shuttle fleet was grounded by an elusive I 
hydrogen leak that foiled our efforts to fill the orbiter's external fuel tank. I 
I was the external tanWsolid rocket booster project engineer on 
the ground crew during that painful stretch of mainly trial-and- 
error efforts to locate &d solve the problem. It drove us crazy for 
more than six months-a Florida-length summer. As painful as 
it was, the experience demonstrated the incredible dedication 
and persistence of the workforce and, we eventually discovered, 
showed the importance of designing tests that match flight 
conditions as exactly as possible. 
Columbia (STS-35) was on Launch Pad A for a scheduled 
May 30 launch when we discovered the hydrogen leak during 
- 
tanking. The external fuel tank is loaded through the orbiter. 
Liquid hydrogen flows through a 17-inch umbilical between the 
orbiter and the tank. During fueling, we purge the aft fuselage 
with gaseous nitrogen to reduce the risk of fire, and we have 
a leak-detection system in the mobile launch platform, which 
samples (via tygon tubing) the atmosphere in and around the 
vehicle, drawing it down to a mass spectrometer that analyzes its 
composition. When we progressed to the stage of tanking where 
liquid hydrogen flows through the vehicle, the concentration of 
hydrogen approached four percent-the limit above which it 
would be dangerously flammable. We had a leak. 
We did everything we could think of to find it, and the 
contractor who supplied the flight hardware was there every 
day, working alongside us. We did tanking tests, which involved 
instrumenting the suspected leak sources, and cryo-loaded the 
external tank to try to isolate precisely where the leak originated. 
We switched out umbilicals; we replaced the seals between the 
umbilical and the orbiter. We inspected the seals microscopically 
and found no flaws. We replaced the recirculation pumps, 
and we found and replaced a damaged teflon seal in a main 
propulsion system detent cover, which holds the prevalve-the 
main valve supplying hydrogen to Space Shuttle Main Engine 3 
-in the open position. The seal passed leak tests at ambient 
temperature but leaked when cryogenic temperatures were 
ONE MEMBER OF THE GROUND CREW 
EVEN VOLUNTEERED TO SIT IN THE AFT 
FUSELAGE DURING FUELING WEARING AN 
OXYGEN SUPPLY SO HE COULD CARRY 
A SENSOR AROUND FROM POINT TO 
POINT UNTIL HE FOUND THE LEAK. IT'S 
NO SURPRISE THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS 
VETOED ON SAFETY GROUNDS, BUT 
HE WAS READY TO DO IT-THAT'S HOW 
FRUSTRATED AND DETERMINED WE WERE. 
applied. We added new leak sensors-up to twenty at a time- 
and tried to be methodical in our placements to narrow down 
the possible sources of the problem. We even switched orbiters, 
sending Columbia back to the Vehicle Assembly Building and 
bringing out Atlantis, scheduled to fly as STS-38. Two shuttles 
on their mobile launchers passing in the night was a majestic 
sight, but not one you want to see if you're trying to get an 
orbiter launched. None of this told us where the leak was, or if 
we were dealing with more than one leak source. 
One member of the ground crew even volunteered to sit in 
the aft fuselage during fueling wearing an oxygen supply so he 
could carry a sensor around from point to point until he found 
the leak. It's no surprise that his proposal was vetoed on safety 
grounds, but he was ready to do it-that's how frustrated and 
determined we were. 
Eventually, since nothing else had worked, we put a series 
of leak detectors outside the orbiter, near where the umbilical 
connected with the external tank. We found the greatest 
concentration of hydrogen there, so we knew, finally, that the 
leak had to be at the seal we had changed out and so rigorously 
inspected. Now that we knew the leak was there, we were able 
to figure out what was happening We knew from the testing 
that the leak would appear when the liquid hydrogen, which 
is much colder than the gaseous hydrogen used to chill the 
system, was flowing through the vehicle. The extremely cold 
liquid hydrogen made the metal of the joint contract unevenly, 
creating small gaps that the hydrogen escaped through. The 
fix seems counterintuitive: we added spacers outboard of the 
bolts in the umbilical flange; when the bolts were tightened, the 
inside diameter of the flange squeezed down tighter on the seal. 
We also slowed the loading sequence to reduce the cold shock 
created when the liquid arrived at the joint. 
But how had the seal passed all its tests at the contractor? 
Why didn't they see the leak then? Since they were working so 
closely with us, they were able to supply the answers as soon 
as we understood the problem. They had tested the seals with 
liquid nitrogen, not liquid hydrogen. They had a good reason 
for that choice. Their facility in Downey, once fairly isolated, 
had seen Los Angeles grow around it. With schools and offices 
nearby, testing with hydrogen had become too dangerous. Liquid 
nitrogen was the safe alternative. But liquid hydrogen, at about 
-253"C, is much colder than liquid nitrogen, which liquefies at 
about -196°C. Also, hydrogen atoms are many times smaller than 
nitrogen atoms. So the seal worked fine with liquid nitrogen, but 
liquid hydrogen created gaps it could slip through. (Hydrogen 
atoms are so small, they can even escape through a weld.) 
The lessons we took from this experience, in addition 
to seeing that persistence and dedication eventually pay off, 
are these: 
Don't take anything for granted. 
Stay in constant communication with the 
hardware manufacturer. 
Test as you fly. 
On October 6,1990, Dhcovevy took off from Launch Pad 39B, 
the first launch since April. Other successful launches would 
occur in November and December. The summer of hydrogen 
was over. 
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Leading Your Leaders 
BY N. WAYNE HALE, JR. 
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When I was a new NASA employee, my bmch chief put together a training class that has been on my 
mind recently Among the other things he taught us new e m p 1 0 ~  was that we had to lead our leaders. 
That has always been pod advice I'd like to share some of those thoughts and expand on them. 
First of all, remember that your leaders are not very smart. Once 
upon a time some of us might have been smart in certain subjects, 
but that was long ago. Being a manager dulls your technical skills. 
So who is smart? The smartest guy is the person with his 
hand on the tool, running the test or doing the analysis. That 
person has all the information. He or she understands all the 
limitations of the test or analysis. The smart guy knows how the 
part or test or analysis fits in the context of its surroundings. 
Unfortunately for us managers, the smart guy is almost 
always so intimately connected with the hardware/analysis/test 
that it is hard for him to explain to the rest of us just how it 
works. It is hard for an expert to communicate to a layman, 
especially with all the connotations that give meaning to the 
subject. But the guy doing the work is still the smartest person 
in the world on what the work means. 
In between that smart guy and the upper management 
bosses live the dreaded middle managers. These folks are semi- 
smart: they have some recent experience, they understand part 
of the data, they have gotten the verbal reports unfiltered, and 
they can sometimes go see the test rig or the flight hardware. 
But these middle managers are subject to pressures from the 
personnel department, the "budgeteers," the schedulers, and 
the paperwork bureaucrats who are so prevalent in our system. 
This causes smart technical folks to lose their technical 
abilities when they become middle managers. So the middle 
managers are only semi-smart, and, worse, they control the 
communication chain-the middle managers determine what 
gets told and to whom. 
- 
The top leaders are supposedly the decision makers, but they 
- - 
are really not smart. Once they were real workers and perhaps 
were really smart, but that was so long ago that they most likely 
used slide rules. (I sure did.) They haven't solved an integral 
- 
equation in twenty years nor have they used a torque wrench 
in decades (except to break the lawnmower last summer, like 
I did). Meanwhile, senior leaders spend most of their waking 
hours thinking deep thoughts, subjects like what are the goals 
of the Agency for the next twenty-five years, how should the 
governance model work (and what the heck it's about), and how 
should we deal with congressional staffers or the White House? 
Brain-numbing stuff. 
So how do the smart guys get the decision makers to make the 
right decisions? Simple: The smart guys have to lead their leaders. 
Don't be mistaken: everybody I have met in this outfit has 
their heart in the right place. Everybody wants the mission to 
succeed and the crew to come home safely. But sometimes the 
right way to reach those goals is complicated. 
To make it easier, here are some tips on how to lead 
your leaders: 
1. REMEMBER TO EXPLAIN THE PROBLEM. 
Even though working on a problem has been your primary 
effort for the past year, your leadership may have heard 
about this once in a briefing a decade ago. Now they are 
basically clueless. Pretend that you are talking to your 
daughter's fifth-grade class. Explain how your complicated 
gizmo works. If possible, do not use acronyms. Define 
your terms. Put your work in context. Assume your leader 
has no idea what you do, who you work for, or what your 
gizmo does. That is a good place to start. 
2 TELL YOUR LEADER HOW THIS PROBLEM 
SHOULD BE SOLVED. 
Remember, taking the next century to study the problem 
or spending the Gross National Product to invent a 
new solution are probably not going to be acceptable 
solutions. Real engineers and technicians build real 
hardware that works in the real world in a reasonable 
manner within a reasonable time at a reasonable cost. 
True, skimping on time or money can cause mistakes, 
but folks whose gizmos are delayed unreasonably or cost 
more than is practical get their programs canceled, force 
the business into bankruptcy, or give the market over to 
10 1 ASK MAGAZINE 
the competition. Real engineers and technicians always 
consider cost and schedule in their work. 
3. DON'T CRY WOLF. 
If you repeatedly tell top management the world is going 
to end, and then it doesn't end, your credibility will suffer. 
Worst-case analysis or worst-on-worst tests are mandatory 
and results from them must be reported, but these tests and 
analyses don't represent what wilhappen. It is not enough to 
demonstrate how badly things might turn out; it is important 
to show how the hardware will most likely perform and put 
the really bad outcomes in the right context. 
4. SOLVE THE PROBLEM. 
Raising questions is important. However, we are in the 
business of doing things. Engineers and technicians are 
paid to get things done. Yes, you have to identify the 
problem, frame the design, identify the tests, perform 
the analysis, and assemble the hardware. But the goal 
is to solve theproblem. Nobody ever said flying in space 
was easy. We make it look easy the same way that an 
Olympic champion makes her sport look easy: by 
working hard at improving performance every day. 
5. MIKE GRIFFIN HAS SAID, "NOBODY GETS TO DO 
HOMEWORK PROBLEMS AND PUSH M E  PAPER 
UNDER THE DOOR." 
What that means is that we all have to understand the 
risk relative to the bigger picture. No matter where you 
are on the org chart, you have to understand the context, 
be able to place the risk involved in relation to the risk of 
the alternatives. You don't understand the risk (or cost, 
schedule, or performance) of the alternatives? Then 
you have homework to do. Be prepared to put your 
recommended solution in relation to the alternatives. 
6. BANISH THE WORDS "WE JUST DON'T KNOW* 
FROM YOUR VOCABULARY. 
When you say those words, you empower dumb upper- 
level managers to make a decision based on their 
inadequate understanding of the problem and on other 
factors (like cost and schedule). Do you really think 
the guy at the end of the table who just came from the 
budget meeting is a better expert than you are on your 
gizmo? No. It is important to say how you are going 
to find out those things you don't know. If you are the 
smartest guy and you don't know, at least provide a plan 
on how we will get to a good solution. As a famous 
astronomer once noted, "We don't know one-tenth of 
one percent about anything." That's true, but it doesn't 
stop us from trying to build things that work. So we 
do what they still teach in engineering school: make 
some reasonable approximations. Neglect the terms that 
provide a relatively small contribution to the answer. 
Give it the best you've got. Instead of saying, "we just 
don't know," tell your leader what you can do and what 
approach you are going to take, and include a description 
of the variations that may result from your work. 
You can also use some elements of good flight rationale to 
provide to your not-so-smart leaders. 
First, use expert judgment. After flying this equipment for 
years, hands-on experts have learned a great deal. Judgment, 
honed over a long period from observation of many space flights 
and the operation of our hardware, is valuable. When faced with 
a problem, it is imperative to review the previous history and 
TRUE, SKIMPING ON TIME OR MONEY 
CAN CAUSE MISTAKES, BUT FOLKS 
WHOSE GIZMOS ARE DELAYED 
UNREASONABLY OR COST MORE 
rHAN IS PRACTICAL GET THEIR 
PROGRAMS CANCELED . . . 
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performance of the hardware. And the opinion of the engineers 
and technicians who have worked with the equipment for many 
years is of incalculable value. On the other hand, using everyday 
experience or the "logic" of folks who are not familiar with the 
- 
specifics of the way the hardware works is worse than useless in 
our business and can lead to the wrong conclusions. 
Next, use analysis. A good analytical tool-verified against 
real-world performance (including all variables), peer reviewed, 
and operated within the limits for which it was intended-is 
a powerful way to understand what could happen. However, 
the output of analysis always contains an error or level of 
uncertainty, and the validity of the analysis output always 
depends on the inputs and assumptions. Assume a worst case 
and you will get one answer. Assume a nominal case and you 
get a different answer. It is important to report all these results 
along with the basic accuracy of the analysis. To conduct an 
analysis without understanding limitations and uncertainties is 
the edge of the cliff the equipment is operating, but it does 
demonstrate how the hardware really works. A flight test is the 
ultimate test, again taken with the knowledge that it is probably 
not the extreme but something more like the middle of the 
environmental and systems performance. 
Good understanding of a problem and its solution always 
relies on a combination of all these methods. Be sure to lead 
your leaders by using all the tools you have at your disposal. 
At the end of the day, decisions in space flight always come 
down to a risk trade. Our business is not remotely safe, not in the 
sense that the public, the media, or our legislators use the term. 
Everything we do has a risk, cost, schedule, or performance 
trade-off. For your leaders to make an appropriate decision, you 
need to educate them, lead them, talk with them, and engage 
them in the discussion until full understanding takes place. 
It's your job. *, 
- 
an incomplete analysis. An analysis not anchored in testing or 
an analysis tool used in ways for which it was not designed can 
lead to inaccurate conclusions. A "back of the envelope" analysis 
based on first principles can also be terribly misleading in our 
line of work, where we deal with extreme environments and 
complex mechanisms. 
Better are the results of a well-defined test. Remember 
that a test on a laboratory bench is always an approximation of 
reality, and rules similar to those for good analysis also apply. 
One should always be mindful of Mechelay's rule: "It is better 
to be stupid than to run a stupid test." Often we try to overtest. 
If a piece of hardware passes an unbelievably difficult test, then 
life is good. More often when an unbelievably difficult test fails, 
we are left with a very long discussion of why and what was 
wrong in the design or execution of the test. Make sure that the 
test is well defined. Even then, it is important to explain to your 
leaders what inherent accuracy (or error) the test conditions or 
equipment have and what the assumptions or initial conditions 
were for the test. Test results without a good understanding of 
the test's accuracy or the pedigree of the test assumptions are 
worth very little. 
the manager of the Space Shuttle 
Finally, there is flight test data. Always limited, never at on Space Center, a position he has 
the edge of the envelope, it still shows how the real hardware held since September 2005. In this capacity. he is responsible 
for overall management, integration, and operations of the Space 
works in a and combined environment' Shuttle Program. He also served as a shuttle flight director for 
is dangerous because it typically doesn't show how close to forty flights from 1988 to 2002. 
On September 27, 2007, a Delta I1 rocket carrying the Dawn spacecraft lifted off from Kennedy 
Space Center. Part of NASAs Discovery program, the $370 million Dawn mission began its 
three-billion-mile voyage to the asteroid belt to study the asteroid Vesta and Ceres, a dwarf planet. 
The spacecraft is scheduled to reach Vesta in 2011. After spending nine months measuring the 
composition, shape, and topography of that body, it will travel a billion miles to carry out a similar 
analysis of Ceres in 2015. 
As manager of NASA's Discovery and New Frontiers program what to do and, to a large extent, how to do it-end of story. 
at Marshall Space Flight Center, I had oversight responsibility When we formulated the Discovery and New Frontiers 
for Dawn, which the Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) was program, however, we decided to take a different tack. All 
managing while developing the spacecraft with Orbital Sciences our projects were developed either by JPL or Johns Hopkins 
Corporation. Over the years, Marshall has had a reputation University's Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). We knew these 
for taking a command-and-control approach to program and organizations actually knew what to do and how to do it. While 
project management: tell the project institutions or contractors the responsibility for mission development lies squarely with the 
project, we in the program office could make real contributions 
to problem solving and decision making, and we could bring 
technical expertise to bear when needed. We would not impose 
Marshall's specific set of "how-to" rules on them. Instead, we 
wanted to focus our energies almost entirely on enabling and 
supporting the success of these project teams. 
We strove for trust and mutual respect, not control. It 
was an uphill battle at first, and there were some folks who 
frankly just didn't trust our intentions. It took six months of 
demonstrating by our actions that we really were committed to 
this approach and were there to help. We had to earn their trust. 
I distinctly remember the day I knew the approach had worked. 
I walked into my office and found a yellow sticky note on my 
desk: Charles Elachi, director of JPL, wanted to talk to me. I 
picked up the phone and returned his call. He explained he had 
been a skeptic about the Discovery Program Office, but he had 
been won over by numerous reports from his staff and project 
managers that the office had helped them in some way. 
Trust and cooperation build on each other; genuine 
cooperation creates more trust, which leads to more cooperation. 
Several months after that conversation, when APL ran into a 
late-breaking problem with their autonomy system on the New 
Horizons project (the onboard system for handling anomalies 
independent of instructions from mission operations), JPL 
offered up one of their most senior directors to lend a hand. He 
traveled to APL and stayed there for three weeks, rolled up his 
sleeves, and helped them solve the problem. 
Ion Propulsion 
Dawn's long, complex journey is made possible by the spacecraft's 
extremely efficient, futuristic ion propulsion system. Xenon ions 
expelled at high speed provide thrust. Their speed is high-about 
25 miles per second-but their mass is low, so the amount of 
thrust is miniscule compared with conventional rocket engines. It 
is about the same force as that applied by a single sheet of typing 
paper resting on your hand. At full throttle, it would take one of 
Dawn's three ion engines four days to accelerate the spacecraft from 
0 to 60 miles per hour. But the engines can operate for extremely 
long periods of time. (They are expected to fire for more than 
five years over the course of the mission.) One of Dawn's engines 
operating continuously for one year uses only fifteen gallons of 
fuel to increase the spacecraft's speed by 5,500 miles per hour. 
Artist concept of the Dawn spacecraft after launch. 
Deep Space 1, launched in 1998, was the first and only 
other NASA mission to use ion propulsion, so there were still 
technological and developmental hurdles to overcome for Dawn. 
Developing the system presented several engineering challenges 
that were also management challenges. One of the engineering 
challenges facing the JPL engineers working on Dawn was to 
understand the behavior ofthe nearly 1,000 pounds ofxenon the 
engines required when the Delta 11 rocket's third stage spun. 
Most spacecraft do not have difficulty sensing post-separation 
spin rates while the propellant and spacecraft are exchanging 
angular momentum. For Dawn, however, the heritage gyros 
of the spacecraft attitude control system saturated at too low 
a spin rate for this problem. Since a significant fraction of the 
flight system's moment of inertia was in the xenon propellant, 
and given the low-saturation rate of the gyros, it was critical 
to mission success to understand the xenon spin behavior. If 
- 
the attitude control system was activated while the gyros were 
saturated, the hydrazine propellant needed for the mission 
would have been expended in the first minutes of the mission, 
resulting in mission failure. 
- 
JPL engineers had no previous relevant experience to help 
- 
them understand the potential problem. Success came from 
not simply identifying and assigning blame for the problem 
or taking control of it away from the group trying to solve it, 
but instead from focusing on how to help them succeed. The 
Discovery Program office immediately-offered engineers at 
Marshall a number of lessons about propellant slosh dynamics of 
superfluid helium learned while working on the Gravity Probe B 
project. This gave JPL engineers the support they needed to 
develop analysis and test techniques to resolve the problem. 
Later, the xenon tank failed during qualification testing. 
The failure occurred just below the qualifying pressure, 
though-significantly higher than the nominal operating 
pressure. Focusing on the goal of mission success rather than 
the letter of the law of requirements, the Discovery Program 
Office gabbed pressure vessel experts and worked alongside the 
project to develop the recommendations and rationale to lower 
> 
the operating pressure while maintaining mission performance 
requirements. This avoided the significant delay and expense 
redesigning, rebuilding, and requalifying the tank, which was 
already installed on the vehicle, would have caused. 
Launch Delays 
After a couple other assignments, I rejoined Dawn as deputy 
associate administrator for programs in NASA Headquarters' 
Science Mission Directorate. In this role, I chaired the Program 
Management Council (PMC) that provided the recommendation 
to the associate administrator to proceed with final launch 
preparations. Dawn was scheduled for launch between June 20 
and July 10, 2007, which, from four months out, seemed a 
reasonably generous launch window. Consequently, I was bullish 
on our ability to launch in this timeframe. After the PMC, I put 
out a press release announcing that we were "full steam ahead." 
But as always seems to be the case, Murphy was right, and we 
learned the hard way how seemingly minor circumstances and 
delays can cascade into major problems. It's like the old saying: 
"For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse 
was lost; for want of a horse, the rider was lost . . ." and so on. 
In Dawn's case, what seemed like a relatively benign ten- 
day slip in the delivery of the second stage fuel tank cascaded 
into what Steve Francois, the Launch Services Program manager 
at Kennedy Space Center, called "the perfect storm." What 
happened? Here's a sampling. 
The P3 Orion surveillance aircraft, which was ready 
to provide telemetry during the original launch period, had 
another commitment during the new launch window dates. We 
purchased the services of a navy ship that could sail to the eastern 
Atlantic to receive the telemetry, but it had mechanical problems, 
ran into twelve-foot sea swells and unfavorable ocean currents, 
and failed to get to the location on schedule. We ordered up 
yet another telemetry aircraft, Big Crow, which also developed 
mechanical problems and could not get to its deployment 
station. We encountered a crane failure from a simple bearing 
that cost another week. Then there was the weather. 
In July at the Cape it's common for afternoon thunderstorms 
to develop and force transportation and fueling delays. We 
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At Astrotech, workers check the Dawn spacecraft after testing the deployment 
of its more than 32-foot-long solarpanels on one side. 
encountered a stationary weather front that sat on us for several 
weeks. Our slipping schedule began to impinge on the planned 
launch date for Phoenix, cutting into the time required between 
launches. Since Phoenix was aMars mission, missing their launch 
window would cause an unacceptable two-year delay and cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars, so their schedule needed to take 
priority over ours. As we neared the fish-or-cut-bait point, the 
frequency and intensity of discussions increased dramatically. 
The odds were increasingly against successfully launching both 
Dawn and Phoenix within their windows. Discussions were 
elevated to the highest levels in the Agency, and our governance 
model was once again tested when there was disagreement as to 
whether the requirements for telemetry could be waived entirely. 
The right decision was made in the end, but it was a tough call. 
When the dust from "the perfect storm" settled, we ended up 
slipping the launch to a new window several months down the 
road at a cost of more than $25 million. 
I drew two conclusions from this experience. One is a 
reinforcement of the need to maintain vigilance in examining 
the potential downstream repercussions of seemingly small 
issues. The other is that it is important to know when to fold 'em. 
You need to look at your situation realistically and objectively 
assess the risks without personal bias. When circumstances 
demand it, give up the effort to launch at the earliest possible 
date, as hard as that is to do and as much as that may feel like 
a failure. Temporarily standing down the Dawn launch was a 
tough decision, but it was the right one. 
quality and success. Emphasize commander's intent over 
rudder control; let them know where you want to go and 
when you want to be there, then let them figure out how 
to get there. 
Open and honest discussion of issues is essential. People fill 
the void of the unknown with their worst fears. Get folks 
around the table and have open, honest, and frank dialogue. 
I've seldom seen this fail to get to the root of issues. 
You have to earn your seat at the table, proving that you 
are competent, trustworthy, and dedicated to the success 
of the mission. 
Know when to fold 'em. Your pride can get rolled up in 
making a milestone or launch date, but you have to make 
a judgment based on the realities of the situation and 
not wear down the team trying to meet an increasingly 
impossible deadline. 
The NASA governance model that gives a voice to the 
concerns of engineers and safety experts works-trust it 
and use it. 
Successful Launch 
Dawn finally launched successfully-at dawn-on 
September 27, 2007. By November 14, while the spacecraft 
traveled away from Earth, controllers at JPL completed testing 
the ion propulsion system. The craft began long-term thrusting 
for its interplanetary travels in mid-December and will reach 
Vesta in a little fewer than four years. 
The Important Lessons 
The demands of Dawn and other challenging missions I've 
been involved with have taught me some important lessons 
for successful program and project management. As far as I'm 
concerned, these are the main ones: 
TODD MAY is the deputy assoc~ate administrator of the Science 
Program management, particularly of uncoupled and Mission Directorate, located at NASA Headquarters. He is 
loosely coupled projects, should be more about enabling responsible for the efficient and effective execution of NASA's 
vast portfolio of robotic programs and projects, ~ncluding than You're working with motivated, high- more than 100 spacecraft in various stages of formulation, 
performing teams and institutions with a track record of development, and operation.  
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BEST BUY: 
PLANNING FOR DISASTER 
BY ADAM SACHS AND KERRY ELLIS 
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When a 1981 tornado in Minnesota revolutionized the retail approach of Sound of Music, which 
later changed its name to the now very familiar Best Buy, those who founded the company never 
imagined that a series of hurricanes twenty years later would also help give it a cutting-edge lead 
in customer service and disaster planning. That original "Tornado Sale'' introduced low prices in a 
"no-frills" environment that gave the company higher sales than the industry average and paved the 
way to a new business model. But before Best Buy could find the silver lining of these new storm 
clouds., it needed to survive them by planning for the destructive weather that plagued Florida 
during the summer of 2004. 
Having corporate headquarters in the Midwest gave Best Buy 
little experience with hurricanes after it expanded nationally and 
opened stores in Florida in 1994. By then, Hurricane Andrew 
had already run its course in 1992, and Minnesota had seen few 
tornadoes since the early eighties. When Adam Sachs, regional 
merchandising manager for Best Buy at the time, was called 
into his supervisor's office in August 2004 and asked to present 
a plan for preparation and recovery for a hurricane forecast to 
brush the Florida coast, he found little to support his efforts. 
Best Buy had disaster plans, but nothing detailed or specific 
enough to handle what might be headed its way. 
Knowing he didn't have all the answers to help the more 
than 38 stores and 5,000 employees that could be affected, Sachs 
reached out to those who could help find them: the facilities 
manager, the operations manager, and others with relevant 
expertise within the company. A week before the hurricane was 
forecast to hit their region, those involved scheduled conference 
calls twice daily to update needs and recommendations as well 
as seek resolutions and answers. 
The group did well with what they considered "preworY- 
preparations for taking care of their employees and facilities. 
Their facilities manager had arranged for local contractors to be 
on call for roof repairs, water extraction, glass repair, electrical 
needs, and HVAC issues. Their operations manager had plans 
in place to help with payroll, store closings, and point-of-sale 
systems. District managers printed lists of all store employees 
and their phone numbers so they could track their safety and 
the well-being of their families. Sachs led the command center, 
facilitated the conference calls, coordinated plans to properly 
secure stores if and when evacuations were ordered, arranged 
guards to protect and secure the properties, and rescheduled 
with logistics partners for product deliveries. 
When Hurricane Charley made landfall August 13, 2004, 
it took a few unexpected turns and cut through Orlando, which 
hadn't been directly hit by a hurricane for more than forty years. 
The plans Sachs had helped pull together still worked, and Best 
Buy was able to locate all its employees, ensure their families 
were safe, and open most of its stores the next day. However, 
many area residents and customers were unprepared for the 
storm. Best Buy stores were able to help by providing batteries, 
power inverters, portable DVD players, flashlights, radios, 
and portable battery-operated televisions, but they did not 
anticipate requests for emergency supplies like gas generators and 
water. And power outages meant their normal sales equipment 
didn't work. 
Thanks to the creativity of Best Buy employees, the stores 
were able to jury-rig a solution by setting up tables outside and 
using runners. Customers could walk up to a table, ask if the 
store had a battery in stock, and those outside would radio an 
employee in the store to grab the battery. Most customers paid 
cash, but Best Buy did process credit cards they verified through 
cell phones. Though they were able to meet these immediate 
needs, Sachs and his planning team realized they had overlooked 
some aspects of taking care of their customers, and they set 
out to remedy this before another storm hit the area. Key to 
improving the customer experience was getting feedback from 
the customers themselves and from the employees who were 
working in the affected areas. 
People often share their stories in times of crisis, so the 
information the managers and directors needed steadily poured 
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in. During a call after the first storm, the leadership team freely Store leaders and employees also helped identify additional 
communicated what their customers had said they needed. processes, partners, and even product needs that could help 
Taking this information to heart, Best Buy worked out a deal for future storms. Sachs and his team of experts took all the 
with Pepsi, their beverage vendor at the time, to bring in ample ideas and needs and wrote them out on a whiteboard in order to 
amounts of bottled water. "We hadn't specialized in water," said break them out by discipline and areas of responsibility. Then 
Sachs. "No one thinks, 'I need water, i'll go to Best Buy,' but everyone took charge of their areas of respoisibility and tried 
our customers were asking for it. So five to seven days before to find solutions. The first storm response was mainly about 
the next storm was supposed to roll through, we called Pepsi to the company's facilities and employees. "For the second, third, 
get cases of water." They also sought out gas generators and still and fourth storms, we knew it had to be 'and'-employees 
carry them in their stores today. Every time they were able to and families and customers," said Sachs. As a result of these 
communicate with their customers, they learned more. efforts, Best Buy created Web sites and provided BlackBerries 
to help with communication, expanded 
their mix of battery-operated products, 
. 
improved facility maintenance, and 
built processes around asset recovery 
and insurance claims. 
They also refined processes 
that were good in theory but proved 
difficult to execute. The list of store 
employees and their phone numbers is 
one example. "We realized that was a 
great idea," said Sachs, "but we didn't 
have a way to call some of those people 
because their phones didn't work. 
Some of our store leaders drove out to 
find their employees, and it was much 
more tedious than we anticipated." 
For the second storm, Best Buy set up 
voicemail in another market that would 
be unaffected by the hurricane and gave 
the number to its employees. "Instead of 
us calling them, we-had them call us. 
The message would tell our employees 
when we planned to open and when 
they could come back to work. If their 
family had any needs, they could let 
us know at this number and we'd help 
them." And it worked. 
The company also looked to 
improve things it already did well. 
Though it carries batteries for radios, 
appliances, and toys, that stock usually 
I HAVING SEEN THE POWER OF LISTENING TO ITS EMPLOYEES AND CUSTOMERS, 
I BEST BUY NOW SEEKS TO CAPTURE THEIR THOUGHTS AND FEEDBACK ABOUT 
1 OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE BUSINESS. 
numbers in the hundreds. During a power outage, company 
officials realized they could use thousands, so they called their 
battery vendors. "Energizer and Duracell partnered with us 
to get products our competitors didn't have," explained Sachs. 
"We were the first retailer to get a flashlight that took any 
kind of battery. We also started carrying crank flashlights." 
After the second hurricane hit less than a month later, 
several of the regional leaders drove to the hardest-hit stores 
and visited with the employees to thank them and hear their 
stories. "We were shocked to see how appreciative they were of 
our efforts and concerns over their well-being. They thanked 
us for the water, food, and ice," said Sachs. From that day on, 
Best Buy added store visits to its standard operating procedure 
for disaster recovery. 'Xfter one of the storms, one of our 
managers hooked up a generator to his house and had twenty- 
two employees staying there. We didn't realize the emotional 
impact it would have on our employees and their families. We 
knew some of these employees had no intention of working at 
Best Buy as a career, but their families would say our company 
would always be a part of their lives. We knew Best Buy was us. 
We knew we represented the brand. So it was very important 
to us, and it was life-changing." They drove thousands of miles 
to accomplish this outreach, through Orlando, Punta Gorda, 
Miami, Pensacola, and several in between. 
By the end of the summer, three hurricanes had devastated 
Florida with the last, Hurricane Jeanne, making landfall twice. 
The storms hit in such quick succession that the regional leaders 
and employees had little time to do more than refine their 
disaster planning. Execution improved each time, and they 
enhanced a few elements of the process. For example, instead of 
writing down the voicemail number they created for the second 
- 
storm and handing it out, they began printing up business cards 
with the emergency information. 
After each storm, Best Buy would ask its employees and 
customers, "What do you need?" In response, they added 
more products. Between the second and third storms, the 
~ l a n n i n ~  team realized their customers' insurance adjusters 
wanted pictures. They knew disposable cameras and digital 
cameras were important for accomplishing this, so they 
increased their stock. 
Many of the items they began to stock for these emergencies 
became a permanent part of their stores. Best Buy originally 
stocked power inverters, which allow you to use a regular plug 
in the cigarette lighter jack in your car, only in disaster-prone 
areas. "We soon realized there were other needs for this item," 
said Sachs. "Do you need a hurricane to lose power? No. You 
can lose power anywhere for any reason for an extended time." 
Power inverters are now in stock at all their stores. Gas generators 
are sold in all coastal and hurricane-area stores. 
The plans Sachs and his team developed for one of Florida's 
toughest summers are the foundation of Best Buy's current 
- 
disaster response procedures, and they were used when Katrina 
struck New Orleans one year later. Thanks to those plans, it 
took Best Buy only thirteen days to find every employee that 
worked in the New Orleans market. 
Having seen the power of listening to its employees and 
customers, Best Buy now seeks to capture their thoughts and 
feedback about other elements of the business. To help unleash 
that power, Best Buy offers immense recognition for employee 
ideas. They distribute certificates, plaques, and trophies, and 
they invite contributing employees to leadership meetings to see 
how their ideas will be implemented. If an idea is accepted by the 
company everywhere, the employees are recognized nationally. 
What Sachs took most from the experience was realizing 
- 
that many voices can be better than one. "If you have a map, 
throw it out the window and unleash the power of the people 
who are involved," he said. "They will know more than anybody 
else what their needs are. Take every one of their needs to heart, 
no matter whether you think they're serious or not, to really 
value the unique ideas of the employees. At the end of the day, 
your plan will be better because of it. One little idea from an 
employee on the journey, which is continuous, enhances and 
morphs itself into something more than the original idea was or 
could hope to be. Unleash the power of the people; value their 
ideas and experiences." 
ADAM SAGHS has worked at Best Buy forflfteen years and strll 
resrdes ~n Florrda He IS currently the dlrector of store operatrng 
model capabrlrt~es, where he and hrs team focus on store support 
to Improve the employee and customer experience and drrve 
shareholder value 


About six weeks before the competition date, I had a that allowed me to make a fist without feeling any resistance 
breakthrough "Aha!" moment. I knew I needed to constrain from the tape. I knew I had a winner, and after a few more 
the pressure inside the glove's finger but at the same time allow iterations, I had created a working flexible finger design. The 
it to flex. Late one night I came up with the idea of creating a next task was to join four of these fingers to a palm and to 
"linkage" across the joint of the finger, but I was struggling with develop a functional metacarpal (knuckle) joint. It took quite 
how to do it. I was applying strips of tape to my fingers in an a few tries to figure this part out, not just the mobility element, 
attempt to simulate links when I came up with the "X" design but also the patterning and fabrication sequence. I followed the 
same process of incremental failure to learn and ultimately to 
come up with a flexible metacarpal joint. 
I followed the same process for the thumb articulation, and 
finally the wrist joints, with less time available for each. The 
final step was putting all the elements together into a complete 
glove. I only had one day to accomplish this, but, because I 
knew each element worked and I had refined the patterning and 
fabrication sequence (and my fabrication skills) through all that 
repetition, I was confident I could pull it off. As it turned out, I 
was only able to test the first glove in my homemade glove box 
for about an hour because I had to get back to work fabricating 
the second, identical glove the rules required. That marathon 
build session lasted until it was time to leave for the event, so I 
first tried out the second glove during the actual competition. 
Once the event began, I learned that five teams had registered 
to compete-four individuals like myself, and Team MDLH, 
- 
which included spacesuit mobility expert Gary Harris, aerospace 
engineer Pablo de Leon of the University of North Dakota, and 
Nik Moiseev, who until 2005 was an engineer with the Russian 
firm Zvezda that designed that country's current and Soviet- 
era spacesuits. Two teams dropped out before the competition 
started because they had not finished their gloves in time. So the 
official lineup was myself; Ted Southern, a graduate art student 
from Pratt Institute in New York; and Team MDLH. And of 
course the "house glove," NASA's Phase VI glove. 
After going over some preliminaries, the competitors were 
asked to bring out their gloves. This was the first opportunity 
to see each other's work, and it was immediately apparent that 
there were three very different designs. Aside from some initial 
"acceptance" testing (length, weight, leak check), there were 
three major components to the scoring: strength, flexibility, 
and comfort/dexterity. The first challenge was a burst test to 
evaluate overall strength. Each competitor chose one glove to be 
slowly pressurized until it failed. The higher the pressure before 
failure, the higher the score. I chose my first glove, the one I 
had tested, because I was afraid that it didn't have enough "life" 
left in it to get through the thirty-minute dexterity test. I was 
relieved to see it go to almost 22 psi before failing, well over 
the 13 psi qualifying minimum. Unfortunately, Ted Southern's 
entry didn't reach the minimum required pressure, which 
disqualified him from the remainder of the competition. It was 
now down to me, Team MDLH, and the Phase VI glove. Team 
MDLH's glove survived to more than 29 psi, putting them in 
an early lead. 
The next day began with finger flexibility measurements 
using a force gauge on the pressurized gloves, including the Phase 
VI glove. Many measurements were taken by test engineers from 
Hamilton Sundstrand, the prime contractor for the current EVA 
suit. Because the raw measurements needed to be converted to 
torques and combined into a final score, it was impossible to 
keep track of who was ahead in this phase. The final comfort 
and dexterity test was performed in a depressurized glove box to 
simulate real on-orbit conditions. Each competitor was required 
to exercise the glove through a defined set of finger, thumb, and 
wrist motions without any sign of abrasion or bruising of the 
competitor's hand. I learned a lot about arm fatigue! This was 
a pass-fail event, and both of the remaining competitors came 
through intact. After taking what seemed like an eternity to 
tally the final scores, the judges announced that I had won the 
competition. My glove was the only one to have achieved lower 
finger-bending torques than the Phase VI glove. 
Looking back, I see three sources of the success of this 
project that I believe also operate in other programs where 
small teams have broken new gound in aerospace technologies. 
These are awareness, failure, and trust. By remaining aware of 
the big picture, continuously asking myself, "Am I converging 
on a solution?" and "Am I converging fast enough?" I was 
Homer sews his glove concept. ' 
able to see that my original design was not going to succeed, 
leading to the decision to start over. I was also aware that, had 
I lingered over this choice or taken time to analyze it, I would 
not have been ready on the first day of competition. Failure 
forced me to look outside conventional thinking and opened 
the door to innovation. Choosing to make incremental failures 
enabled me to rapidly climb the learning curve. Trusting my 
"gut" feelings-which are really an internalized accumulation 
of experiences-and my newly acquired skills allowed me to 
devise new technologies rapidly and complete both gloves just 
in time. Awareness, failure, and trust are intertwined: failure 
provides experiences that inform awareness and provide 
decision-making opportunities that build trust among team 
members and managers while opening minds to new pathways 
for development. All three are necessary for teams-large or 
small-to achieve big innovation. 
This story was told aspart of a broaderpresentation on how 
small teams achieve big innovation, delivered at NASA APPEL 
Masters Forum 15 on October 16 2002 in Phoenix, Arizona. 
For more information about the Centennial Challenges, visit 
hn-p://centennialchallenges. nasa.gov. 
nfm lldMsR has ten patents related to space structures, 
thermal control, and deployables. His career in aerospace spans 
more than two decades, most recently developing commercial 
communications satellites for Lockheed Martin Space Systems 
(formerly GE Astro Space) and leading configuration and design 
of the A2100 spacecraft bus structure. His experience also 
includes systems engineering and engineering management for 
software giants SDRC, Netscape, AOL, and Sun Microsystems 
and organizational leadership in the nonprofit world. 
I was standing in the dining room of a rambling white Victorian on Mount Desert Island, home to 
Maine's Acadia National Park. Arrayed before me on a massive wooden table lay an antique sewing 
machine, an improvised pressure test stand, a glass vacuum chamber, and an immense collection of 
gloves and fingers. I had driven across this mountainous island as an engineer and curious educator 
hoping to get my hands on Peter Homer's Centennial Challenge-winning astronaut glove. 
Alexis of Pemetic Elementary School tries on one of Peter Homer's "failed" glove designs. 
I'd come to Mount Desert Island to found the Island 
Astronomy Institute, in part to fill the space sciences gap in the 
island's schools with a grant from NASA's Maine Space Grant 
Consortium. News of Peter's prize-winning astronaut glove had 
spread across the island's towns like wildfire, in part because 
this type of engineering simply does not happen here. 
My own experiences designing and building commercial 
spacecraft, including the three satellites of the Sirius Satellite 
Radio constellation, made it easy to admire Peter's mechanical 
aptitude. My first patent grew out of multiple failures. I was 
one of three engineers assigned to solve a high-profile, on-orbit 
performance issue. Fabricated with our own hands from custom 
composite materials, our first full-scale engineering model of a 
2.4-meter "self-supporting aperture cover" was a total failure. 
The second model was almost a complete failure, but we were fast 
learners. Our third attempt is now used on dozens of satellites. 
As Peter unfolded his story, I couldn't help but smile. 
Here was a road I had traveled many times but had never seen 
portrayed with such clarity. Each piece of glove Peter picked 
up spoke volumes about the creative process of planned failure 
and incremental success. On the table lay the physical evidence 
of insight, perseverance, and, perhaps more than anything else, 
the ability to visualize precisely what was required to arrive at 
a winning design by the competition deadline. I was impressed 
and excited about the educational possibilities. 
The way of thinking that Peter so clearly embodies is 
reflected in the Institute's mission to promote astronomy as a 
stimulating educational and cultural activity for people of all 
ages. The full significance of this way of thinking was brought 
to my attention in 2006 by a National Academy of Sciences 
report called Learning to Think SpatiaLb. The report recognizes 
the ability to visualize and manipulate objects in space as a 
poorly understood, previously unrecognized "blind spot" in the 
nation's educational system. It describes spatial thinking as a 
fundamental cognitive process "integral to the everyday work 
of scientists and engineers that has underpinned many scientific 
and technical breakthroughs." I knew from my own experience 
that this was a nonverbal skill, a unique kind of knowledge that, 
once grasped in a flash of understanding becomes as natural as 
riding a bike. 
The Island Astronomy Institute was founded on the 
proposition that astronomy provides an efficient, engaging way 
to teach advanced forms of thinking now characterized by the 
National Academy of Sciences as enabling deep understanding 
across the wide spectrum of knowledge-intensive fields. 
- 
Advanced spatial thinking allows experts to conceive of and 
express highly abstract concepts through a language of spatially 
conceived analogies and metaphors. 
The ability to envision a physical perspective outside our own 
bodies comes into play when we recognize our own image in a 
mirror. Expanding this spatial skill across broader dimensions 
of time and space is essential to developing deep astronomical 
knowledge. It is one thing to state that Earth revolves around the 
sun; it is quite another to stand under a noon-day sun and point 
to where the earth you are standing on will be in three months. 
Ironically, attention to these critical spatial skills is usually 
limited to the first years of elementary school. Some people have 
the ability to mentally rotate our sense of physical orientation to 
the East, West, North, and South without thinking, but many 
don't. The process is so instinctive in those who possess it, we 
describe it as a "sense" of direction. Spatial concepts are deeply 
rooted in our most basic perception of our physical surroundings. 
Several college students in our philosophy of astronomy class 
reported feeling the earth move under their feet as they repeated 
Galileo's observations through a telescope; was Jupiter moving, 
or was it Earth? 
The challenge of extending students' skills in spatial 
thinking to astronomical scales was the central focus of our 
K-8 curriculum development. When the project's lead teacher 
requested a curriculum that cumulatively built on each prior 
year's learning in a spiral fashion, I knew exactly what the school 
was asking for. Second and third graders began by noticing 
the cyclical patters that the sun, moon, and stars make in the 
sky. Fourth graders explored the phases of the moon by taking 
turns modeling and sketching them in their classroom and then 
comparing them to the real sky. Sixth !graders used real telescopes 
to observe a moving model of our solar system and walked a 
scale model of the planets' orbits. The curriculum is designed 
to expand students' capacity to visualize space in a hierarchical 
fashion that asks them to imagine themselves from a broader 
number of spatial perspectives through hands-on activities. 
The "situational awareness" Peter's story describes is a 
hallmark of high-performance engineering and innovation. 
Keeping in mind the potential outcomes of multiple paths of 
pursuit from multiple perspectives while keeping track of their 
relative merits and performance requirements is a demanding 
spatial task. 
What made it possible for Peter to transform the failure 
of his first glove into triumph was the mental space in which 
that failure provided exactly the information needed for a new 
breakthrough. In at least two cases, Peter could immediately 
"see" the full implications of what his hands were telling him. 
He tells the story of how putting his hands in a Phase VI 
astronaut glove instantly transformed his understanding of the 
glove challenge. Six months into his development, the failure 
of circumferentially wrapped cords to produce a sufficiently 
flexible glove again forced him to abandon his assumptions. His 
situational awareness was so clear and compelling it became a 
gut-level response. Peter's finely developed spatial skills enabled 
him to almost instinctively focus his full energy on a carefully 
constructed set of experiments. The finger's ability to sense 
pressure, force, and work gave him the immediate feedback 
required to solve this one central problem. Once properly 
understood, his failure quickly led to the magical "Aha!" 
moment of discovery; the rest is history. 
Peter worked in the kind of information-rich, hands-on 
environment so essential to science education. At the request 
of local teachers, Peter and I hauled his collection into class to 
test my belief in the glove's educational potential. Peter and I 
shared his engineering process, complete with failures and the 
principles of pressure, force, and work at play in the successful 
design. Then we gave students the chance to get their hands on 
it all, letting them develop their own spatial understanding. The 
feedback from the students and teachers was that the glove was 
an instant hit: they really "got" it. 
Just as children need opportunities to develop hands-on 
understanding, engineers need to explore new possibilities 
through incremental hands-on failure. High-performance 
innovation is all about learning to make maximum use of 
thinking spatially to direct this process. Peter Homer's glove 
also reminds us that efficient engineering decisions need to be 
made as close to the hardware as possible. Whether we're doing 
hands-on education or hands-on engineering, it is when we trust 
in our ability to "feel our way" through failure that we reach our 
highest potential. 
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The Power of Story 
BY JESSICA FOX AND DON COHEN 
'I know what I have given you. I do not know what you received." 
When he wrote these words, Antonio Porchia, an Argentinean 
printing press owner in the 1930s, wasn't thinking about project 
management. But he articulated a major knowledge-sharing 
issue that is the source of many project problems: how to 
communicate our intentions so that the information received is 
the same as the information given. 
One answer is convers~cion-the back-and-forth of 
statement, question, and response that gradually brings talkers 
and listeners to a shared understanding. Stories also offer a way 
to share knowledge effectively. While the storyteller's intent and 
the listener's interpretation will not be identical, a good story 
reliably communicates essential knowledge so it is not only 
The sociological function of stories, Campbell explains, 
helps maintain and validate the social order of a society. Stories 
pass on information about power relationships, taboos, laws, 
and the inner workings of communities. Countries and religions 
have stories that serve this function and so do organizations and 
project teams, where stories about project work communicate 
information about behaviors and attitudes that are expected and 
rewarded or frowned upon and penalized. 
understood but absorbed and embraced. 
Narrative is one of the oldest knowledge-transfer systems 8 W 8 E  STCIRIES A M O g  ALWAYS TIILL, 
in the world. Religion knows it. ~oliticians know it. ~airytales m m  A OR OWUP E Q R E  
know it. Now, knowledge management practitioners are 
coming to know it, too. But why are stories such a powerful FAGINa AGHmENGE LISTENERS S: THE 
knowledge-transfer tool? And what kinds of knowledge do 
they transfer? l%ENTS OF THE STOW VHROklGH THOSE 
Joseph Campbell, the mythologist, defined stories as (NDMSWALS r).((iJ~Qms AND, tqy~q(&, 
serving four major functions: the mystical, the cosmological, 
the sociological, and the pedagogical. The mystical function 
of narrative lies in its ability to open up emotional realization 
that often connects with a transcendent idea such as love or 
forgiveness. He calls this realization "mystical" because it 
connects the self with the universal. 
What Campbell calls the cosmological function of stories 
relates the self to the outside world, focusing on action, on 
understanding cause and effect and our role in it. For the 
cosmological function of stories "to be up to date and really 
to work in the minds of people who are living in the modern 
scientific world," Campbell notes, "it must incorporate the 
modern scientific world."* We must continually tell stories that 
demonstrate our current vision of the world. 
Functioning pedagogically, says Campbell, narratives guide 
individuals harmoniously through the stages of life in terms of 
their world today, with its current goods, values, and dangers. 
These are stories that deal with life transitions and guide us 
from one stage to another. 
Stories powerfully serve these functions partly because of 
two great strengths: their ability to engage listeners personally 
and emotionally and their use of metaphor. And it turns out 
that these two things are related. 
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I~ETAPHOR FREES US TO INTERPRET STORIES 
INDIVIDUALLY. STORIES, METAPHOR, AND NARRATIVE 
ACTIVATE OUR INNATE IMPULSE TO SEARCH FOR 
MEANING. AS LISTENERS, WE PLAY WITH THEM LIKE 
KIDS ON WELL-CONSTRUCTED JUNGLE GYMS. 
Because stories almost always tell about a hero 
or group of people facing a challenge, listeners see the 
events of the story through those individuals' thoughts 
and feeling. We tend to identify with the hero and live 
the story through him or her. Think about the tragedy of the 
Apollo 1 fire. A lot of essential technical information about what 
happened was captured in reports that followed the accident. But 
the story of what happened communicates the sorrow, pain, and 
guilt of the accident, the human failings that contributed to it, 
the passionate determination of the survivors to do better and to 
go on. Hearing the story today helps NASA engineers understand 
their limitations and what's at stake in their work, and it 
inspires them to work harder and better. Stories get us as close 
as we can to learning from experience without actually having 
the experience. 
As the interview with storyteller Jay O'Callahan in this 
issue of ASK makes clear, metaphor-images that suggest a 
range of meaning-makes stories powerful and rich. Metaphor 
is part of what makes listeners active participants in stories, and 
they must engage with and interpret these images that work on 
the show-don't-tell principle. An image that has to be explained, 
Campbell says, is not working. You would never say, "He was 
a deer in headlights, and what I mean by that is that he was 
stunned, scared, and caught unaware." 
Metaphor frees us to interpret stories individually. Stories, 
metaphor, and narrative activate our innate impulse to search 
for meaning. As listeners, we play with 
them like kids on well-constructed 
jungle gyms. We feel as if we are 
extracting meaning ourselves, and we 
- - 
are-stories don't force a single, simple 
conclusion on us. But a good story 
~uides us, so that what we learn is what 
- 
the story wants to tell us, but adapted 
to our own needs and interests. 
Charles Dickens's A Christmas 
Carol demonstrates the transformative power of 
living through a story. Ebenezer Scrooge's nephew, Fred, 
and his employee, Bob Cratchit, try to talk him out of his 
stinginess to no avail. Even the ghost of his former partner, 
Jacob Marley, can't convince him to change his ways. Only 
directly witnessing the drama of his past, present, and future 
gives Scrooge an emotional understanding of the meaning ofhis 
life powerful enough to change him. 
Although we are not all so fortunate to have the ghosts of 
our past, present, and future create a personal holodeck for us 
to journey through, a good story can come close to giving us a 
sense of lived experience. The technical information we need to 
do our work probably comes from other sources, but stories tell 
us how we work and-even more important-why we work. 
'Joseph Campbell. Mythos, DVD. D~rected by Robert Walter (New Yo*. NY' Wellspring. 2002) 
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O'Callahan 
BY DON COHEN 
Jay O'Callahan is one of the world's best-known 
storytellers. He has performed at Lincoln Center, 
at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin and other theatres 
around the world, at the Olympics, and with the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra. His work appears 
regularly on National Public Radio. In addition to 
creating and performing stories, he leads workshops 
on storytelling and writing. Don Cohen talked to 
him at his home in Marshfield, Massachusetts. 
COHEN: At NASA, we've been talking 
about the value of storytelling for 
knowledge sharing. Why are stories 
important? What do we get from them? 
O'CALLAHAN: Stories draw you into the 
experience and imagination of the 
storyteller. Reading one of your ASK 
interviews, I was intrigued with astronaut 
Eileen Collins saying that in space she 
looked down and thought, "The earth is 
round." Then she said, "Of course I knew 
that, but I was seeing it with my own 
eyes!" Eileen's words were so simple and 
direct; I could feel her excitement in the 
simplicity of her words. Her excitement 
was such that I imagined that if Einstein 
and a kindergartener were with Eileen 
Collins, they might have all shouted, 
"The earth is round." 
Storytelling knits images together 
and those images touch on something 
deeper than themselves. They touch on 
mystery. Think of the image of the Statue 
of Liberty. 
The job of the storyteller is to 
invite the listener into the world of the 
story. The storyteller uses events and 
images to capture beauty, fun, struggle, 
characters-all in an accessible way. 
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... I THINK PEOPLE ARE distracted. THEY ARE ALMOST too 
busy TO FOCUS ON ANYTHING, BUT space exploration IS SO 
extraordinary I THINK OUR IMAGINATIONS CAN catch fire 
AGAIN. AFTER millions of years WE'RE ABLE TO LEAVE THIS 
EARTH AND explore what's beyond." 
COHEN: When we think about stories, 
we usually think about events more 
than images, about how a character 
deals with a problem or a challenge. 
Isn't wondering about what's going to 
happen an important part of stories? 
O'CALLAHAN: Astronaut Gene Cernan, 
speaking at Acton High School in 
Massachusetts, said walking on the 
moon was like dreaming or like hearing 
a story before bedtime. I think he meant 
the experience was full of mystery. Only a 
word like dream could communicate how 
unusual the experience was. The deepest 
stories, like Moby Dick, touch on mystery, 
and there is something mysterious, 
bravely wild, and joyous about exploring 
the universe. 
A friend of mine, Gail Gutradt, is 
writing a work in progress about her 
volunteer work with children who have 
She said yes, and he asked if they'd been 
to the sun. "Too hot," Gail said. Samorn 
mused then brightened, saying, "Maybe 
they could fly in a rocket made of ice." It's 
Samorn's journey, too. 
Astronaut John Young said after 
he commanded the Cobrnbia shuttle, 
"We're really not too far, the human race, 
from going to the stars." We humans are 
sticking our big toe into the universe. 
COHEN: There's a good bit of danger and 
uncertainty in that adventure. I think 
those things are often part of compelling 
stories. 
O~CALUHAN: Usually stories have elements 
of risk, trouble, challenge, adventure. 
These elements are universal because 
they're part of life. A story gets exciting 
when someone takes a risk. With risk 
there's tension and with tension there's 
AIDS in Cambodia. Gail was speaking energy, and the energy draws us into 
to a seventeen-year-old boy, Samorn, who the story. NASA's work involves great 
hopes to be a doctor. He asked Gail if it risk. Sometimes, as with Challenger and 
were true men had walked on the moon. Columbia, the result is tragedy. 3 
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COHEN: It's interesting that the Apollo 
missions to the moon, which were 
extremely risky, were presented to the 
public in dull language, almost as if they 
were routine. 
O'CALLAHAN: I lived through that time. I had 
a sense the astronauts were invulnerable. 
They were so well trained, and the engineers 
behind them were superb. Nothing was 
going to go wrong. That's one of the 
reasons the Challenger crew's death moved 
people so deeply. Christa McAuliffe was 
not an engineer; she was a teacher and 
she died, and the whole space enterprise 
became very human. The Challenger 
lifted off and in seventy-three seconds the 
Space Shuttle disintegrated. Seventy-three 
seconds. That's a day I'll remember, like 
the day of Kennedy's death. The danger 
was there, but we were lulled into thinking 
the space flight was routine. 
COHEN: YOU also experienced the 
Sputnik era. Sputnik went up almost 
exactly fifty years ago. What impression 
did that make on you? 
O'CAWHAN: Sputnik made a huge impression 
on my high school, the country, and me. 
People were frightened that the Russians 
were getting ahead of us. The Cold War 
was oppressive in high school. There 
was no sense of wonder in our chemistry 
class. It was all: Sputnik! Learn! We had 
a math teacher who said, "X! Why can't 
you find X!? The Russians have Sputnik. 
They're watching us. Find X or we'll all 
be speaking Russian! " 
COHEN: Can people be taught how to tell 
stories? 
O~CALLAHAN: In workshops I draw stories 
out of people. Everyone is filled with 
stories. Flannery O'Connor says if you 
get through childhood you have enough 
stories for a lifetime. 
I use simple suggestions that I call 
- - 
"sparks" to elicit stories. I might say, 
"Can you recall a moment in your life 
when a shoe was important?" Then I 
give people a couple of minutes to tell 
their memory to a partner, after which 
I have the partner appreciate what was 
alive in the story. The appreciations are 
information which the storyteller builds 
on. The appreciations can be about 
language, character, detail, expressions, 
sound of the voice, gesture, and 
emotion-anything that's alive. 
- 
There was a doctor in one of my 
workshops who talked about having 
marvelous handmade shoes when he was 
a freshman at the University of Chicago. 
He often noticed a pretty girl he wanted 
to ask out and finally got the courage. 
On the third or fourth date he asked, 
"Why did you say yes when I asked you 
O U ~ ? "  She said, "I thought anybody who 
would wear shoes like that must be very 
interesting." They've been married thirty 
years. His story was fresh and told with 
great warmth. 
COHEN: The emotion comes from the 
fascinating detail, rather than, say, 
training in vocal expression? 
O'CALLAHAN: The emotion comes from 
a hundred places. There is a universe 
within each of us: family characters, 
friends, enemies, and fictional characters. 
And so many moments. It's the job of the 
workshop leader to bring the moments 
out so the storyteller is more aware of 
the gold mine within and aware of his 
or her strengths. By strengths I mean a 
sense of humor, enthusiasm, a presence, a 
way of using language, a sense of beauty. 
I've found most people are not aware of 
their strengths. That's why appreciations 
are important. 
Professor Talbot Page, an environmental 
economics professor who's just retired from 
Brown University, took my workshops 
in order to find new ways to stimulate 
his students. Professor Page began using 
this method of appreciations and found 
his students responded well and wrote 
better papers. 
COHEN: SO if you did a storytelling 
workshop for NASA project managers 
and engineers, you'd listen for the 
interesting details? 
O'CALLAHAN: I would start with little things, 
like the shoe spark, just to be playful and 
build up trust. Then I would ask: what 
are some wonderful moments in your 
work? What are some hard moments? 
COHEN: I think you've had the experience 
of creating stories about the history of 
a place or an organization. What is that 
process like? 
O'CALLAHAN: I was commissioned to 
create a story about the steel-making 
community of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 
PouringtheSun, the story, took three years 
to create. Steel-making was not my world. 
I was compiling what I call the "compost 
heap," talking to salesmen, steel workers, 
foremen, community people, managers, 
historians, and union representatives. 
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ING IS A creative process. IT TAKES attention-THAT'S k
- - -
CRUCIAL-AND IT TAKES A generosity OF SPIRIT." 
I 
The information I gathered became the 
campost pile. It heated up, and the story. 
came alive. As I gathered the in-Formation, 
it was important to be in the city of 
Bethlehem, to be in the steel plant, to 
know the place. I've karned &at place is 
very imporant. 
COHEN: Why? 
QCALLAHAN: Place becomes a character in 
every story. It's so obvious, it's invisible 
to us, but plae shapes us. A lot of 
my stories are about growing up in a 
place called Pill Hill, a predominately 
wealthy neighborhood in Brooklime, 
Massachusetts. Pill Hill shaped me. The 
trees ther% the neighbors, the political 
and religious conflicts that were go% on 
which seemed electric to me as a boy. 
When I%n commissioned to do a 
stmy, I need to be part of the place. I 
need to talk to the people who live and 
work there. I need to walk the streets. 
In the city of Bethlehem, I met one 
family, the VPaldonys, and I centered 
the whole Bethlehem Steel story on 
Ludvika WaIdonp; Ludvika was eighteen 
when she came from Poland on a shrp by 
herself in 1307 with very little education 
and almost no money. The story is told 
through her eyes. I hope Ludvika's story 
captures the experience of hundreds 
of thousands of immigrants who came 
fromealall over the world to work in the 
steel-making city of Bethlehem. 
COHEN: If you were telling a story about 
NASA, do you have a sense of what it 
might be about? 
OICALLAHAN: My firm: job would be to 
talk with M A S  people-sciendsta, 
engineers, astronauts. I'm sure that 
underneath the whole NASA enterprise 
there is a sense of mnder. Perhaps 
sci- and myth are coming together 
in NASA. The myths of old were a h  
stories about the sun, the stars, and the 
moon. Now with NASA, weke going 
out there. NASA i s  turning our eyes 
heavenward just as the ancients did. 
COHEN: I &member the excitement of the 
first moon landing, and Walter Cronkite 
presenting it a6 a world-changing 
event, but then the world didn't seem 
to change all that much. I think many 
people were disappointed. 
O~CALLAHAN: Rather than disappointed, 
I think people are distracted. They are 
h o s t  too busy PO focus on anything, but 
space qlorarion is so extraordinary I think 
our imagiaations can catch fi again. After 
millions ofyearswekeable to lame this earth 
and explore what's bqond. That's amazing 
Ifpeople can take this in thefll realize how 
astonkhii it is. Thw are m r s  on Mars 
and now weare headed toward sending a 
manned spacecraft to Mars. 
In another ASK interview, Michael 
Coats says, 'When 1 look down, rm no 
longer a T a m  or an American; I'm part 
of the human race," In time we may all 
see through the eyes of Michael Casts 
and realize we can find ways to live and 
work in greater harmony: 
COHEN: DO stories need to be told face 
to face? 
O~CAUII~IAEJ: I think that's best. Radio, 
DVD, and print are wonderful, but when 
I read Eileen Collins* AS..  interview, 
I was so moved I wanted to meet her> I 
wanted to hear her voice. Storytelling is 
a fundamental way of communicating. 
Ideally a story is told direcrly to another 
person or a group of people. 
COHEN: When story listeners and 
sWryteHera are together, I think they 
affect each other. 
O~CALLAHM: Listeners mysteriously haw 
the power to draw out details, images> 
and memories, Listeners can inspire the 
storyteller. Becominga goodlistener takes 
a liktime. Listening is a creative process. 
It takes attention-that% crucial-and it 
takes a generosity of spirit" My children 
listened me into being a storyteller. 
Listening is key. 
NASA3 work is thrilling. They're 
exploring the universe. We haven't taken 
in the wander of it, but one day well 
wake up astonished. 
3 n  October 4,2004, Brian Binnie piloted SpaceShipOne 
above km, marking the third time ever-and the 
-econd time in as many weeks-that a civilian astronaut 
nad taken a privately built craft to outer space. In doing 
so, Binnie and SpaceShipOne captured the $10 million 
Ansari X PRIZE for Mojave Aerospace Ventures-a small, 
cutting-edge private enterprise- led by legendary aerospace 
designer Burt Rutan and finanbed by Microsoft co-founder 
Paul Allen. Amazingly rhis small &&, operating only for 
a short amount of time and spending an incredibly small 
amount of money, had joined t b  LJJited States, the USSR/ 
Russia, and C&m in the exclusive {anb of human space 
flight powers. 
nadillo Aerospace in less than six months, flies at the 2006 X PRlZ 
d to win the Northrm Grumman Lunar b d e r  C w n n ~  
THEY OFTEN GO FROM DRAWING ON THE BACK OF A NAPKIN TO FIRING ENGINES 
OR EVEN FLYING VEHICLES IN A MATTER OF WEEKS OR MONTHS, LEARNING 
VALUABLE LESSONS ALONG THE WAY. 
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Prizes like the Ansari X PRIZE and later efforts like the NASA- 
funded Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge and 
the recently announced $30 million Google Lunar X PRIZE 
exist to focus public attention and apply innovative new ideas 
to targeted technical problems. Many of the new ideas are 
elegant technical solutions, like Burt Rutan's use of feathered 
wings on SpaceShipOne. Equally, if not more, important are 
the innovative program management practices that come into 
play when extremely small and motivated teams put their own 
money on the line to win a prize. Just as SpaceShipOne is not a 
replacement for the Space Shuttle or other governmental human 
space flight programs, prizes like those offered by the nonprofit 
X PRIZE Foundation will not, and likely cannot, replace 
government design, development, or procurement methods. 
But just as SpaceShipOne and its counterparts in the private 
sector can provide effective lessons and practical applications for 
government programs, so too can program mangers at NASA 
and other government agencies take important cues from the 
teams competing for prizes. 
In my two and a half years at the X PRIZE Foundation, 
I've had the enormous pleasure of working with several such 
teams. The experience gives me a front-row seat from which to 
observe breathtaking innovation. The individuals and groups 
that are attracted to these prize competitions are a particularly 
fascinating subset of the human species: passionate, strong- 
willed, risk-taking, and imaginative. 
The space industry would benefit from the involvement and 
enthusiasm of any one of this new class of steely-eyed missile 
men and women. On their own initiative and with their own 
funding, these pioneers put an enormous variety of concepts 
through the tests needed to expose each as a useful tool or a 
dead end. 
With one of our space prizes successfully claimed, another- 
the Lunar Lander Challenge-just shy of being won, and the 
Google Lunar X PRIZE recently announced, we can already 
begin to look at the progress of the teams and draw important 
conclusions. I won't presume to call them "lessons learned" as 
the lessons from each still need to permeate the industry and 
inform decision making across the sector. Instead, I think the 
struggles of each team have revealed some important lessons 
that we need to learn. 
Build, Test, Fly, Destroy, Repeat 
The early days of rocketry and space exploration in the United 
States were marked by incredibly rapid progress: a seemingly 
endless parade of firsts. Not coincidentally, this period also saw 
more than its fair share of failure, especially in the infamous 
"kaputnik" days prior to the successful launch of Explorer. 
Without a standard canon of known quantities to turn to, 
the early pioneers of rocketry and space flight were forced 
to dream up new ideas that ranged from the elegant to the 
bizarre and to accept the fact that the price of radical progress 
is occasional failure. 
Nowadays, rapid prototyping and testing have slowed, as 
we rely more and more on the extensive knowledge pined by 
our predecessors and on the embarrassment of riches modern 
engineers get from computational modeling and computer- 
assisted design. In many cases, this leads to much improved or 
phenomenally more efficient designs. It also, however, fosters 
a culture so terrified of failure that we over-engineer and 
overanalyze everything, often tweaking designs for decades 
before a new system takes flight. (This is not a problem unique 
to rockets; the same phenomenon seems to have occurred in 
high-performance jets.) This is one reason why it was possible for 
President Kennedy to dream of the completion of the Mercury 
and Gemini missions and a successful landing on the moon in 
under a decade, while returning to the moon may take nearly 
twice as long. 
Lacking access to the tremendous computational resources of 
the national space program-and, just as importantly, removed 
from the harsh judgment of public shareholders or congressional 
appropriations committees-the hungry entrepreneurs who 
High above the Mojave desert, White Knight carries SpaceShipOne aloft for the 
first of its two Ansari X PRIZE-winning flights. 
compete for our prizes tend not to display such fear of failure. 
Instead, most of them follow a rapid "build, test, fly" program. 
They are willing to throw a handful of concepts against the wall 
and see what sticks. They often go from drawing on the back of a 
napkin to firing engines or even flying vehicles in amatter ofweeks 
or months, learning valuable lessons along the way. Indeed, our 
teams have repeatedly learned many of the most valuable lessons 
after only a few moments ofworking with real hardware-lessons 
that could never have been learned from a CAD drawing, like 
finding the failure modes of different welding practices or tracking 
down the interference between an onboard camera and a GPS 
unit. As Paul Breed, the leader of a Northrop Grumman Lunar 
Lander Challenge team (playfully called Unreasonable Rocket), 
is fond of saying, "In computer simulations the plumbing never 
leaks. In real life, it always does." 
"Not Invented Here" Leads to "Not Invented" 
Aerospace engineers and professionals from other disciplines 
involved in this sector may be endowed with above-average 
intelligence-after all, what they do is rocket science. But they 
are still human and still liable to succumb to vanity and pride. 
This can lead to a variety of actions that, while understandable, 
slow progress. All too often, members of this industry ignore 
solutions provided by other sectors of the industry owing to 
ignorance of those solutions, mistrust of their quality, or a simple 
desire to promote their own handiwork over that of others. 
Though there are exceptions, the new class of entrepreneurial 
companies that compete for our prizes have thrown "not 
invented here" out the window. Given that they directly compete 
for millions of dollars in prize money and usually wager their 
personal fortunes to fund their entries, one would expect them 
to guard their own products and ideas jealously, limiting the 
exchange of ideas. 
Instead, though, our teams consistently advise their 
competitors or distribute labor when teams share common 
requirements. Many of the contestants in the Northrop 
Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge, for example, use a 
public e-mail list called aRocket to share test information on 
everything from onboard cameras or guidance systems to 
specific parts or propellant combinations to the complex and 
detailed mathematics required to, say, characterize the moment 
of inertia of their rockets. The "build, test, fly" strategy these 
teams follow generally leads to a lot of new systems being tested 
to the point of failure; oftentimes, a team posts test results to 
this public list within the hour, inviting others to share in the 
analysis and benefit from their results. 
Similarly, most of our teams have, by necessity, vigorously 
pursued commercial off-the-shelf products. Lacking the time, 
budget, or facilities to reinvent the wheel, they scour scrap 
yards, commercials retailers, and even their fellow teams' shops 
for parts that can be slotted into their design. They also show 
a refreshing willingness to look outside the aerospace industry 
for solutions. Teams have used off-the-shelf products like 
irrigation tubing or automotive parts as the basis for important 
components of their vehicles. Parts and systems slated to go into 
high-performance racing cars or mass produced for consumers 
have gone through impeccable design and quality assurance 
processes and offer economies of scale never before seen in the 
commercial rocket industry. The massive catalog of a universal 
industrial parts supplier like McMaster-Carr, whose Web page is 
bursting with valves, piping, and other parts, practically makes 
these rocketeers giddy. After all, says Breed, the manufacture of 
rockets boils down to "just tanks and plumbing." 
Size Matters 
NASA and the traditional aerospace contractors generally work 
in teams that number in the hundreds, if not the thousands. Since 
the days of Kelly Johnson's Skunk Works, though, the industry 
has recognized the advantage of small groups of exceptionally 
talented engineers working with minimal oversight. 
Regardless of how intelligent and innovative a manager is, 
it seems unlikely that any group of hundreds of contributors 
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ON TEAMS THAT OFTEN NUMBER TEN OR FEWER, THE PEOPLE COMPETING FOR OUR 
PRIZES ARE ALL CONSTANTLY AWARE OF HOW CRITICAL THEY ARE TO THEIR TEAM. 
could ever function as efficiently as a group like Armadillo 
Aerospace-eight close friends who have worked side by side for 
years and can practically finish each other's sentences. Such a 
group can spend most of its time on engineering or production, 
and little in meetings or coordinating labor. 
There Is No Substitute for Passion 
Working with teams seeking these prizes, I am struck by 
one almost overwhelming advantage they have over many 
traditional aerospace workers: incredible passion. For many of 
them, the prize entries are the fulfillment of lifelong dreams. 
Their vehicles are their hobbies, their keys to wealth, and their 
children, all wrapped into one. Team members as a rule cannot 
stop talking about their entries-and cannot stop working on 
them. They dream about their rockets. They talk to their friends 
and coworkers about them. They blog about them. They happily 
give up weekends and use up vacation days to find even more 
time to work. "We're standing on the threshold of a dream," says 
Neil Milburn, vice president of Armadillo Aerospace. There is 
not a 9-to-5 worker among them. Of course, NASA has its fair 
share of motivated employees as well. But the commitment 
of these entrepreneurs, with so much of their personal lives 
wrapped up in their projects, borders on obsession. 
Some of this enthusiasm and passion comes from the 
lofty goals of the prize requirements; some, no doubt, comes 
from the thrill of competition. But I suspect their unbridled 
obsession comes mainly from the high degree of personal 
involvement and ownership each team member feels. In an 
era when the smaller aerospace boutiques of the 1960s have 
merged into a few massive corporate giants, it is too easy for 
engineers, especially younger engineers, to feel like a small cog 
in a massive machine. On teams that often number ten or fewer, 
the people competing for our prizes are all constantly aware of 
how critical they are to their teams. They are intensely and 
deservedly proud of this and work on their machines as though 
their lives depended on it. Their confidence in themselves frees 
them to borrow solutions from others and leads to progress at 
incredible speeds. 
We're. Entrepreneurial Space, 
and We're Here to Help 
The creative, small, privately funded groups that find themselves 
called to our competitions possess, by necessity, a number 
of advantages that allow them to function on infinitesimal 
budgets, by industry standards. Many of these advantages are 
probably impossible to translate to efforts being undertaken by 
the traditional members of the aerospace community. The good 
news is that, despite the occasional playful bravado of some of 
the more colorful characters involved in these competitions, all 
our teams are die-hard supporters of a robust space exploration 
program and will gladlydo their parts. As such, they can function 
as highly specialized components of the greater aerospace 
workforce. These small, innovative teams can quickly and 
cheaply provide services to their larger brethren. Whether it is a 
Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge team providing 
a flying platform capable of carrying experimental sensors 
on dozens of flights a week, or Ansari X PRIZE competitors 
carrying scientific payloads and their human operators into 
the blackness of space, or the eventual Google Lunar X PRIZE 
winners testing systems and returning data that will support 
NASA's return to the moon, the entrepreneurial community is 
poised to help the national space program like never before. 
WILLIAM POMERANTZ has been the director of space projects 
at the X PRIZE Foundation since 2005. He currently manages the 
Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge, a $2 million, NASA- 
funded prize competition, and he was one of the primaryauthors of 
the Google Lunar X PRIZE. He lives and works in Washington, D.C. a 
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Featured Invention: 
Laser Scaling Device 
After a storm caused extensive hail damage to the shuttle's 
external tank, NASA Space Shuttle operations personnel 
wanted to measure the extent of the damage. Although 
telephoto lenses clearly showed the damage to the external 
tank, the image contained no reference objects to determine 
the exact size of the dents. In many photographic situations an 
object such as a ruler is placed within the frame so the viewer 
will have a visual indication of the scale of the other objects in 
it. This procedure was not possible in this situation, however, 
as several areas were physically inaccessible. Personnel needed 
to know the scale of the damage to determine whether repairs 
would be necessary, so the operations team called on APES 
innovative problem-solving abilities to help. 
Dr. Robert Youngquist, the lead inventor, explained, "Our 
lab is unique here at Kennedy, and there aren't any other labs 
that do what we do. When problems arise that aren't specific 
to any lab, for example corrosion or chemistry, or when strange 
problems arrive, they are brought to our lab. Historically, we've 
fallen into the role as a catchall to solve problems that don't fit 
or aren't supported by the more specific labs." 
Two shuttle engineers, Charles Stevenson and Jorge Rivera, 
came to Dr. Youngquist and APL with the idea for the laser 
scaling device. Dr. Youngquist recalled, "They hadn't thought 
it all through very well, but they had realized that by using laser 
beams, they could get some kind of scaling information. They 
posed the problem and suggested laser beams as a solution. I 
built the system in my lab using lab parts and verified that it 
met the requirements [one-sixteenth-inch resolution at 80 feet] ." 
William Haskell and Robert Cox built the first prototype while 
Dr. John Lane, Kim Ballard, and Dr. Youngquist created the 
software, which converts the pattern in the image and computes 
the distance scale for the entire image. 
The resulting device attached directly onto a camera or 
any other observation instrument to project parallel laser lines 
into the camera's field of view. The lines indicated a known 
distance and generated a set of evenly spaced laser spots on 
the object being photographed. The resulting image projected 
a built-in scale to show the size of the object being seen. The 
accompanying software converted the pattern in the photo and 
computed the distance scale, saving valuable time in establishing 
and documenting measurements. The laser scaling device 
essentially placed a virtual ruler in the field of view that allowed 
the operations personnel to determine the scale of the object and 
measure the extent of the external tank's hail damage with more 
than one-sixteenth-inch accuracy. 
The Kennedy APL team also tested several other design 
prototypes, including multiple lasers versus a single laser sent 
through beam-splitting optics and plastic versus metallic 
housings for the battery. The experimentation resulted in a 
multilaser assembly that used four lasers, as requested by shuttle 
operations ~ersonnel, and subsequent versions that used two 
lasers. Dr. Youngquist said, "We always try to find simple 
solutions. A lot of the hardware that we build, a lot of the reason 
people like us, is because we find simple solutions." 
Dr. Youngquist also cited several factors for his laboratory's 
success: "Ingenuity and mechanical design as well as our 
breadth of background and years of experience are vast here. 
We also provide a strong customer experience-we listen to 
them and the problems that they bring to us. Other labs fix 
things by using what they know, while we will learn things 
or bring problems to other labs when it's outside our realm 
of expertise." 
In September 2003, NASA signed a nonexclusive license 
agreement with Armor Forensics, a subsidiary of Armor 
Holdings, Inc., for the laser scaling device under the Innovative 
Partnerships Program. Coupled with a measuring program, also 
developed by NASA, the unit provides crime scene investigators 
with the ability to shoot photographs at scale without having 
to physically enter the scene, analyzing details such as blood- 
spatter patterns and graffiti. This ability keeps the scene's 
components intact and pristine for the collection of information 
and evidence. 
The laser scaling device elegantly solved a pressing 
problem for NASA's shuttle operations team and also provided 
industry with a useful tool. For NASA, the laser scaling 
device is still used to measure divots or damage to the shuttle's 
external tank and other structures around the launchpad. 
When the invention also met similar needs within industry, 
the Innovative Partnerships Program provided information to 
Armor Forensics for licensing and marketing the laser scaling 
device. Jeff Kohler, technology transfer agent at Kennedy, 
added, "We also invited a representative from the FBI's special 
photography unit to Kennedy to meet with Armor Forensics 
and the innovator. Eventually the FBI ended up purchasing 
some units. Armor Forensics is also beginning to receive interest 
from DoD [Department of Defense] for use in military crime I 
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scene investigations overseas." 
For information regarding the h e r  scaling device, please call Jef  
Kohler, Technology Trdnsfer Agent, at 321-861-7158. 
THE I 
CAROL ANNE DUNN currently works as a project specialist 
in the Technology Transfer Office at Kennedy Space Center. 
She is also the awards liaison officer for the Inventions and 
Contributions Board. 
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Reaching for the APEX at Ames 
BY MATTHEW KOHUT 
"Every manager has the same complaint, regardless of his or her level," says Dr. Jeffrey McCandless, 
strategic advisor for the Human Systems Integration Division at Ames Research Center. "We all say 
it all the time: 'My subordinates don't understand the big picture, and they don't understand all the 
relationships that I, the manager, need to build."' 
As one of the first graduates of the Arnes Project Excellence 
(APEX) development program, McCandless has been trying 
to keep his eye on the big picture. He was one of twenty 
participants selected to go through the pilot year of APEX, a 
professional development program for project managers and 
systems engineers. 'XPEX gave me a much broader perspective 
about the center," he says. "I realized that I have to make sure I 
don't just focus on my own division here." 
Pete Zell, another member of the APEX class of 2006, 
found a different kind of focus in the program. 'XPEX allows 
you to turn down the volume and concentrate on improving key 
project management skills more deeply," he says. Zell, deputy 
project manager for the Crew Exploration Vehicle Thermal 
Protection System, found that APEX meshed perfectly with his 
day job: "I didn't have to go out and search for things to try and 
improve my skills on-I had it all sitting in front of me. The 
fact that I was on a large, multicenter project gave me plenty of 
opportunities to apply the skills to my work." 
Real-world applicability was precisely the intention of the 
program's creators. "APEX is designed and driven to help people 
do what they're supposed to be doing right now, and do it better. 
We consider their project work one big OJT [on-the-job-training] 
assignment," says APEX Program Manager Claire Smith. Smith 
and Ron Johnson, chief of the Systems Management Office at 
Ames, were the driving forces behind APEX. "The process is 
designed so that development happens in a continuous loop," 
Johnson explains. "Experiences and knowledge are generated 
via project work. Those experiences are discussed and reflected 
upon in the mentoring sessions, and then those new insights 
and sharpened awareness are taken back to the project work." 
In addition to on-the-job training, the program includes 
mentoring, coursework, and coaching provided through the 
Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership. 
The first task of each participant is to conduct a self-assessment 
and determine a skill level-developmental, functional, 
or proficient-in twenty-six core competencies for project 
management or systems engineering. APEX integrates each 
participant's competency ratings with the needs that Ames 
center management has identified for competencies in its project 
managers. Participants then choose three or four competencies to 
concentrate on for the year and design an individual development 
plan (IDP) to attain the next level of capability in each. 
"The thing I found manageable about the program was that it 
didn't try to do everything. It didn't try to improve you across the 
entire spectrum, which would've been overwhelming," Zell says. He 
chose budget and fdl-cost accounting, requirements development, 
scheduling and work breakdown structure development, and risk 
management as the four areas in which he would like to improve 
his skills during the year. "I could pick something that I needed to 
do anyway. By doing that, it helped me focus within my project, 
which was valuable, and it gave me constant feedback." 
McCandless focused on NASA procedures, project planning 
and scheduling, and project control. 'Xfier [learning more about] 
NPR 7120.5D, I have a better understanding of the four key steps of 
a project's development from the beginning all the way through to 
evaluation. I've been around long enough to see that some projects 
have failed because some of these pointers in 7120.5 haven't been 
met or done. By seeing them in black and white in front of me, it 
- 
drives that home so I remember it for the next project." 
A key component of APEX is mentoring. Each participant 
has four to six hours per month of one-on-one mentoring with 
a senior-level person in the field. Additionally, monthly team 
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Ames Project Excellence 
Development Pmgram 
mentoring sessions were held with their cohort of project 
managers or systems engineers and led by recognized experts 
who facilitated topical discussions. "The mentoring program 
had to be at least semi-structured," Smith says. "People getting 
together to shoot the breeze is not mentoring." 
For McCandless, both forms of mentoring proved valuable. 
"What helped was a combination of talking to my own mentor and 
the sessions with the group mentor," he says. "The group mentoring 
l i nd  up r+ well with my IDP goals for project control and project 
scheduling. He [the group mentor] would make recommendations 
and give tips and relate them to his own experience." McCandless's 
personal mentor deepened his appreciation for project success at 
the center: "He had good pragmatic insight into what strategies 
were effective here at Arnes, and which projects were succeeding 
and which were failing, and why." 
Zell found it easy to connect on a personal level with his 
mentor. "We hit it off in terms of our philosophies of project 
management," he says. "We basically spent a 1o;of time talking 
about common experiences." 
The multidimensional design of the APEX program is the 
result of an extensive research and development effort dating 
back nearly a decade. "In the late 1990s and early 2000, we 
were pretty successful at getting new research and technology 
projects here at the center," Johnson says, "and we had a lack of 
critical mass of project managers. We were taking people who 
were primarily researchers and putting them in the position 
of managing projects." Smith and Johnson held a series of 
workshops across the center during 2000 and 2001 to gather 
feedback about how to address this issue. 
When they briefed the center's senior management on their 
findings, one of the top recommendations was to establish a project 
manager development program at Ames. At that point, they cast 
a wide net for ideas and information. "We did centerwide needs 
assessment, we did focus groups, we did surveys," Smith says. 
"We came up with a proposal for what a program would look 
like, tying in what we knew about the Academy of Program1 
Project Leadership (now the Academy for ProgramlProject and 
Engineering Leadership, or APPEL), what we've seen at other 
centers, what other centers have tried. We were always checking 
to make sure our program mapped to APPEL. We also looked 
at the PMI [Project Management Institute] model, INCOSE 
[International Council on Systems Engineering], CMMI 
[Capability Maturity Model Integration], you name it." 
"We had a lot of conversations with the Jet Propulsion 
Lab and Goddard," Johnson adds. "We saw those centers as 
models for what Ames was aspiring to be in terms of a center for 
managing space flight missions." 
Their research confirmed what they already knew-that 
strong practitioner involvement would be critical to their 
program design process. 'XPEX is for the practitioner by the 
practitioner," Smith says. "They have to be a part of designing 
it. Otherwise there's no way we could design a program that 
meets their needs." 
At the same time that they worked at the grassroots level, they 
also solicited feedback from the center's senior management. "We 
recognized that in order for anything to succeed here, we needed 
to have a champion at the center management level," Johnson 
said. "You have to have champions, and you have to listen to what 
the senior managers are saying. They have their own ideas." 
In the case of APEX, one of those ideas fundamentally 
reshaped the program. "When we originally started, it was a 
project management development program," Johnson says, 
"but in our meeting with our center director, he said, 'Project 
management is important, but we also need to strengthen our 
systems engineering.' So we basically added that component to 
the program based on what he wanted." 
Following the pilot year gaduation, Johnson and Smith 
conducted a "lessons noted process," and they are now applying 
these insights to the next iteration of APEX. "We call them 
'lessons noted' because insights only become 'lessons learned' 
when we apply them and change the way we do things," says 
Smith. As a second cohort progresses through the program, she 
believes that the Ames community as a whole has a better idea of 
what APEX can become as it matures: "I think the idea of [what 
constitutes] a development program is a lot more conscious, and 
there's a lot more consensus around it." 
THE PROJECT MANAGER WHO 
SAVED 
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The projects George worked on were for state-of-the-art 
communication systems, which had to operate dependably in 
harsh environments. The primary payloads for these projects were 
expensive and complex optical systems that had to be integrated 
with support structures that provided for energy, command, 
and control. The success of these projects sometimes depended 
upon unproven manufacturing processes. When the manager of 
his first project unexpectedly died, George succeeded him and 
completed the project on time and within budget, meeting all 
technical requirements. George's bosses recognized his talents. 
During the next decade, he managed another nine similar projects, 
consistently meeting his technical, schedule, and budget goals. 
There came a time when his organization faced a crisis. A 
series of projects had failed, and the organization's existence 
was in jeopardy. The biggest and most important project was 
a mess-the senior project team members were fighting among 
themselves, and the project manager was floundering. Senior 
management sacked the project manager at a critical stage of the 
project and put George in charge. Within days, he turned the 
project around and achieved one of the biggest successes in his 
organization's history. 
The project manager's full name was George Meade. He 
graduated from West Point in 1835. In the 1850s, he managed 
the construction of lighthouses along the Atlantic coast. He was 
an officer in the Union army during the American Civil War. In 
June 1863, a Confederate army led by the legendary Robert E. 
Lee was marching through Pennsylvania, and Abraham Lincoln 
feared the end of the United States of America as a country. 
O n  June 28, 1863, Lincoln put Meade in charge of the North's 
largest army. Three days later, the Battle of Gett~sburg began. 
O n  July 3, when the guns fell silent, George Meade and his 
army had won the most decisive battle in American history. 
George Meade defeated Robert E. Lee, one of the greatest 
military leaders of all time. How did he do it? By using the skills 
he had learned as a project manager and outperforming Lee in 
all aspects of project management. 
I work at NASA Goddard as a deputy project manager for 
resources. I am also a licensed battlefield guide at Gettysburg. A 
few years ago, the Defense Acquisition University asked me to 
develop a training program that uses the Battle of Gettysburg as a 
case study in project management. I have taken dozens of project 
managers to Gettysburg in connection with this program. 
Most project managers are familiar with the Project 
Management Institute's "Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge" (PMBOK), which identifies the skills 
and knowledge crucial to successful project management. 
An analysis of the Battle of Gettysburg shows that George 
Meade completely outperformed Robert E. Lee in seven of 
the areas identified in the PMBOK: project integration, scope 
management, time management, resource management, human 
resource management, communication, and risk management. 
Meade's superiority over Lee in these areas was critical to the 
North's success at the Battle of Gettysburg. 
Project Integration 
Project managers need to make sure that all the elements of a 
project work together. They must develop and execute plans 
and coordinate changes to those plans. Meade's predecessor had 
kept his subordinates in the dark. As soon as he was promoted, 
Meade found out everything he could about the condition and 
status of his army. He developed a well-coordinated plan for the 
movement of his scattered soldiers to simultaneously protect key 
northern cities, bring the southern army to battle, and allow 
his army to consolidate quickly where the fighting would break 
out. When the fight started three days later, he sent trusted 
subordinates to take charge of the fighting. He knew his job 
was redirecting the movements of his scattered army to make 
sure the efforts of his entire army were coordinated. Because 
of him, all 90,000 of his soldiers knew where to go and when 
to get there. They got there in record time. Each day of the 
battle, he gathered all his key subordinates together to ascertain 
the progress of the battle, to ensure everyone knew what was 
expected of them, and to revise plans for the subsequent day. 
Robert E. Lee, in contrast, was completely surprised by the start 
of the battle and played no role in deciding when or where it would 
occur. He allowed his subordinates to talk him out of repositioning 
their soldiers, resulting in one-third of his army having little ability to 
affect the battle decisively. During the entire three days of fighting, 
Lee never had his three key subordinates in the same place, at the 
same time, to share information and ensure cooperation. 
Scope Management 
A project manager must define the scope of the work, break it 
into manageable pieces, verify and control what work is being 
done, and make sure that the work being done is essential to 
the project. One of the biggest causes of Lee's defeat was the 
southern cavalry soldiers' failure to do their most critical job: 
collect intelligence about the enemy. A week before the battle, 
Lee allowed his cavalry commander, General J.E.B. Stuart, to 
go on an ill-planned mission that crippled Lee's ability to gather 
information about the Union army. They wasted valuable time 
capturing supplies instead of focusing solely on their primary 
mission of scouting. As a result of this "scope creep," Lee's 
cavalry failed to play the role for which it was most needed. Lee 
went into battle knowing very little about the strength of his 
opponent and made key decisions with inadequate knowledge. 
When Meade took command of his army on June 28 and 
ordered its advance, he had to separate it into several pieces to carry 
out all his requirements. Meade made sure that his subordinates 
did exactly what he wanted done by sending them frequent orders 
about the direction of march, number of miles to advance, and 
destinations at the end of each day. He monitored their progress 
closely. If his subordinates failed to reach their daily objectives, 
he chastised them mercilessly. He made sure their independent 
movements were completely in compliance with his master plan. 
He resisted pressure from Washington to send his cavalry chasing 
General Stuart, knowing that he needed his cavalry to focus on 
the crucial role he assigned it. Thanks to Meade's efforts, he was 
- 
able to achieve an incredibly rapid concentration of his soldiers 
and fight the battle with an advantage of numbers. 
Time Management 
Every project manager knows the challenges of schedule and 
the value of schedule slack. The key to victory in the Civil War 
was to get soldiers quickly to where they were needed-the 
battlefield. Meade had his men march an average of twenty 
miles a day for three days. Twelve miles a day was considered 
challenging. Supply wagons were ordered off the roads so they 
would not impede the combat soldiers' march. 
In contrast, Lee did not seem overly concerned about the 
speed of his army's concentration once he knew a battle was 
likely. His official report said that "the weather being inclement, 
the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the 
troops." At one point, 12,000 of his best combat soldiers were 
stopped dead for hours, blocked by supply wagons at a road 
intersection, greatly delaying their arrival at Gettysburg. 
Resource Management 
Project managers must get the resources they need and use them 
effectively. Meade's critical resource was combat soldiers on the 
battlefield. Meade knew the value of keeping a reserve. O n  day 
two of the battle, he kept 20 percent of his combat soldiers and 
25 percent of his cannons as his reserve, to be used as needed. 
One of Meade's incompetent subordinates disobeyed his orders 
and moved his troop to a weak and vulnerable position, where 
they were hit with a devastating surprise attack by 15,000 
Confederates. Meade immediately threw in his reserves, 
sending them where they were most needed, and shifted other 
resources from places where things were quiet. His prompt 
action prevented a disaster. 
The Confederates never had additional troops where and 
when they were needed. When one of Lee's subordinates, James 
Longstreet, was on the verge of a breakthrough, he needed 
additional resources to ensure victory. None were there. He later 
complained, "We received no support at all, and there was no 
evidence of cooperation on any side." 
Human Resource Management 
Project managers get the people they need and use their talents 
to achieve mission success. George Meade knew the importance 
of using the right people for the right jobs. As a condition 
of accepting command, he demanded and got authority to 
Banisaewski talks about one site of the 
Battle of Gettysburg, Little Round Top. 
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promote, demote, and use his generals as he saw fit, based on 
their ability and competence. When Meade ordered his army to 
march northward, he informally reorganized it, putting almost 
half of it under the control of his most competent subordinate. 
When that man was killed in the fighting, Meade sent his most 
junior subordinate to take command, a general named Winfield 
Hancock, who had proven his skills on many past battlefields. 
Hancock performed superbly. 
Lee's team had undergone major turnover. Stonewall 
Jackson, his best general, had been killed two months before 
Gettysburg. Lee promoted two men to take Jackson's place: 
Generals A.P. Hill and Richard Ewell. Lee had always used 
a "hands-off management style that worked well with his 
previous team. It did not work with Hill and Ewell. Time and 
again, they failed to act when Lee expected action, or they took 
actions that Lee had not authorized. They were not ready for 
the independence Lee gave them. He did not give them the clear 
direction they needed. 
Communication 
Projects generate huge amounts of information. A key to project 
success is getting sufficient and accurate information to the 
people who need it when they need it. Meade had a centralized 
organization, the Bureau ofMilitary Information (BMI), to collect 
information from hundreds of sources and turn it into knowledge 
that could be used to make decisions. This organization was located 
fifty yards from Meade's headquarters, and he continuously called 
upon it to apprise him of the status of both armies. 
Lee had nothing comparable to Meade's BMI. He himself, 
assisted by a handful of aides, assumed responsibility for 
collecting and interpreting the information needed to prosecute 
the battle. Lee had little idea of the extent of the casualties his 
army suffered. On the last day of the battle, he ordered an attack 
in which he significantly overestimated the size of his attack 
force. That attack was a disaster. At Gettysburg, Meade had 
access to important information and used that information to 
make smart decisions. Lee's lack of comparable information led 
him to make crucial mistakes. 
Risk Management 
Project managers must identify and quantify the risks that 
jeopardize project success and make plans for dealing with 
them. Meade always considered what might happen if his plans 
went awry. On each day of the battle, he developed detailed 
contingency plans and was always prepared either to attack, 
hold his ground, or retreat. Meade never had to make use of 
these plans, but they were there if needed. 
Lee seemed to operate under a constant expectation ofsuccess. 
In the case of the disastrous cavalry expedition made by J.E.B. 
Stuart, Lee had other cavalry soldiers that he could have used 
to fill Stuart's role. Instead, he sent those soldiers on other, less- 
critical missions. Lee made no plans to address failure in battle. 
At the end of day three, when he finally understood the horrible 
extent of his losses and realized that his army was in danger of 
destruction, he had no retreat plan to draw on. Had ~eade-been 
more aggressive on July 4, Lee's army could have suffered disaster 
due to Lee's lack of planning for a battlefield setback. 
Learning from Meade 
Studying Meade and Lee's performances at Gettysburg can 
help modern project managers appreciate, develop, and use the 
skills they need to be good project managers. The circumstances 
may be different, but the basic principles are the same. This 
dramatic event in American history shows how the skills of 
project management can be used in almost any situation. Former 
project manager George Meade used those skills to change the 
tide of the Civil War. 
JOHN BANISZEWSKI has thirty years of experience as a 
contracting officer, procurement manager, finance manager, 
and deputy project manager on projects at Goddard Space Flight 
Center. He conducts training programs in which he applies the 
lessons learned at Gettysburg to present-day topics such as 
leadership development, teamwork, and project management. 
JDBano2007@yahoo.com 
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Choosing and Developing the Right 
Leadership Styles for Projects 
BY DR. RALF M~JLLER 
Analyzing extensive questionnaires completed by 400 project management professionals, Professor 
Rodney Turner of the Lille Graduate School of Management and I have identified competencies that 
contribute significantly to project management success. Our research helps define the managerial ~ 
and emotional competencies needed to make projects work. We also found that different kinds of 
projects call for different combinations of competencies. 
While some commentators focus on project tools and techniques, 
Aristotle knew thousands of years ago that effective leadership 
depends on the social competencies needed to form good 
refationships and evoke common values. The fact that fewer 
than 50 percent of projects succeed in achieving their aims on 
time and on budget suggests that even the best tools won't do 
the job in the wrong hands. Our research shows that Aristotle 
- 
was right about the kinds of competencies successful leaders- 
including project leaders-must have. 
Earlier research suggests that a manager's leadership style can 
be defined in terms of emotional (EQ), managerial (MQ), and 
intellectual (IQ) competencies. (See table on facing page.) We 
found that emotional competency correlates significantly with 
project success in high-performing projects of almost all types. 
The higher the EQ, the higher the level of project success. 
However, different kinds of projects require different 
competencies. In engineering and construction projects, 
conscientiousness, interpersonal sensitivity, and engaging 
communication contribute most to ~roiect success. This is I I 
because of the need for discipline and due diligence in managing 
these complex projects and also because of thineed to evoke and 
integrate various opinions and possible solutions to problems. 
For IT  projects, the important competencies for success 
once again include engaging communication, along with self- 
awareness and developing resources. Finding the right "tone" 
with others, together with good control over personal feelings 
and helping project team members take on challenging tasks, 
are the attributes of successful leadership in these projects. 
This combination helps IT  leaders overcome the common 
problems of unclear goals and low budgets on the side of the 
project team, and unrealistic expectations on the side of future 
users of the IT system. 
Organizational change projects also require engaging 
communication in addition to motivation, an emotional 
competency. The project manager who rates high on motivation 
exhibits and encourages drive to achieve clear results. He or 
she actively creates the energy that major change requires. In 
combination with interpersonal competencies, this drive is 
essential for managing reorganizations or implementing new 
work processes. 
We found that one competency correlates negatively with 
success in all high-performing projects: vision and imagination, 
an intellectual competency. Visionary and imaginative people 
are without doubt important to project success, but when the 
project manager is too imaginative he can compromise the task 
at hand. Conscientiousness is much more important to successful 
project management than vision. Vision and imagination are 
better supplied by people in other roles, such as the project 
sponsor, who sets and communicates a project's objectives. 
These findings suggest that project managers should think 
consciously of the specific skills their particular projects call for, 
and leaders should pay careful attention to matching projects 
and project managers, developing project managers with the 
skills appropriate to the work they will be doing. It is commonly 
thought that I Q  is somewhat fixed after the age of twelve. E Q  
and MQ, however, can be developed throughout life.* That 
makes it possible for people to learn the competencies that suit 
the needs of a particular project type. 
But developing the intellectual, emotional, and managerial 
competencies that effective project managers need takes time 
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and focused effort. Reading a book on communication does 
not make a person an "engaging communicator," and managers 
do not become experts in motivating others simply by realizing 
that motivation is important. Cultivating these and other 
competencies often requires open feedback from coworkers or 
mentors over an extended period of time to identify areas for 
improvement, followed by training and extensive practice to 
improve in the desired area. 
The effort is worthwhile, though, because good project 
management is much more than tools and techniques. Matching 
project needs to emotional, managerial, and intellectual 
competencies is neither a panacea, nor the only way to improve 
project results. It supplements existing ways of selecting project 
managers for projects. Most importantly, it moves the discussion 
from what to do in projects to how to behave in projects. Isn't 
that something we learn from early childhood on? Finally, that 
approach is making its way into project management. 
This article is based onjoint research done with Professor Rodney 
Turner, Gradudte School $Management Lille, France. The 
researchers acknowledge the financial supportJFom the Project 
Management Imtitute (PMO, the Gadzrate School ofMamgement, 
Lille, and the School of Business at Umed University. Without this 
support the study would not have been possible. 
. . - . . . .- -. . -. . . -. 
- 
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- - - - 
DR. RALF MULLER is associate professor at Umei University, 
School of Business, Sweden and Adjunct Professor at ESC Lille, 
France. He lectures and researches in project management 
leadership, governance, and program and portfolio management. 
He is also the managing director of PM Concepts AB, a 
. R Boyatzls, D. Goleman, and A McKee. mmal Leadeshlp Leamtng to Lead tnfh EmoBmal lntelB~ence (Boston. Sweden-based management consu'tancy' He can be reached at 
Hamar6 Business soh001 Press, 2032) ra&m~eller@pm-concepts.~om. 
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Learning by Listening 
Successfully sharing knowledge is complicated. To acquire 
knowledge, you have to have some idea of what you need to 
know, find a good source for that knowledge, figure out how 
the people (or documents) offering that knowledge understand 
the concepts involved, and work out how the knowledge applies 
to your own activities. An effective knowledge provider needs 
to understand the needs and assumptions of the knowledge 
seeker. For both seekers and providers, an important but often 
overlooked element of the process is listening. Here are three 
stories about effective listening. 
Red Auerbach coached the Boston Celtics to eight consecutive 
NBA championships. There's a bronze statue of him sitting on 
a bench in Boston's Faneuil Hall marketplace-balding, stocky, 
holding his famous "victory cigarn-an ordinary-looking guy, 
but a basketball genius. Part of that genius was an extraordinary 
ability to communicate with his players. It's true he had a loud 
voice, he was passionate, and he knew a lot about basketball. But 
the key to his effectiveness was his ability to listen. 
Celtics star Bill Russell has said, "Red had the greatest of 
ears. After he talked to a player four times, he knew how to 
communicate with him." Listening taught Auerbach how to talk 
to his players. He himself once said, "It's not what you say; it's 
what they hear," putting his finger on an essential truth about 
communication: it only works when you understand the person 
you're talking with and shape your words and manner to how he 
hears-that is, to how he thinks, what he cares about, and what 
he needs. The only way to understand those things is to listen. 
me Groopman notes that, on average, 
doctors interrupt their patients' stories about their ailments 
within eighteen seconds. They interrupt not only because they 
are pressed for time but because they think they understand the 
problem; they have already made their diagnosis. Groopman 
tells stories of doctor error that show how dangerous jumping to 
conclusions and cutting off patients can be. 
Groopman talks about how important it is to respect 
patients and understand that they know things about their own 
conditions that the doctor, for all his training, cannot know. 
Respecting the person you're listening to-understanding 
that he or she has something to teach you-is important to 
all knowledge exchange. Equally important is being open to 
information that challenges your assumptions or hypotheses. 
Doctors who think they already know the answer often don't 
hear contradictory data even when they appear to be listening. 
had worked on organizational 
development for a high-tech firm for three years. Although she 
enjoyed the work and liked the people she worked with, she was 
beginning to think it was time to move on-maybe to go back 
to school to get an advanced degree. 
She had not yet told her boss what she was thinking, but he 
seemed to sense that she was getting ready to make a change. He 
came to her office one morning and said, "If you were able to 
define the perfect job for yourself at this company, what would 
that job look like?" 
She thought for a few moments, then described a job with 
more responsibility and flexibility than her current position, one 
that would allow her to knit together organizational development 
efforts at multiple sites, to visit other organizations to understand 
their related activities, and to develop new learning programs 
that she had not had the time or influence to make happen. 
"OK," said her boss, "that's your job." 
th the company for several years more, doing 
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few years is the success of The Black Swan-a most improbable 
best seller. Written by a commodities trader with a PhD 
in statistics, it wrestles with a question usually reserved for 
professors of epistemology: how can we know things? 
Why review this book in ASK? Here are some good 
reasons. 
A "black swan" signifies a totally unanticipated event. At 
one time, everyone in the Western world thought all swans 
were white. Exploration of Australia turned up black swans, 
however, creatures that deductive reasoning-reasoning from 
a general principle-could not have predicted. Did deductive 
methods allow us to predict World War I, the Internet, the fall 
of communism? This book makes a strong argument for using 
induction-basing conclusions on observed cases-as well. 
Nassim Taleb takes on the industry of people devoted to 
predicting the future in a scientific sort ofway, who develop and 
sell sophisticated prediction models and structures. Using logic, 
observations from Wall Street and politics, his own philosophic 
musings, and arguments from radical empiricists such as David 
Hume and Karl Popper, Taleb shows why the entire industry 
is built on air. His views are well worth pondering by NASA 
project managers and engineers trying to gauge risk and 
anticipate mission challenges. 
Taleb presents a valuable point of view, which we'd call 
"seeing life clear." He believes that our minds have evolved to 
understand events as narratives-to see them as patterned. This 
fools us into attributing many events to causes that are difficult 
or impossible for us to know at the present time. Because our 
brains do not feel comfortable with causal ambiguity, we create 
explanatory narratives to make us happy. With suitable scientific 
dressing, these often baseless conclusions are sold to clients for 
huge sums. 
This book is an unusually entertaining philosophical text. It 
is filled with stories, arguments, jokes, invective, and rhetorical 
excess. If you have even a slight taste for such things, The Black 
Swan is for you. 
The story is a familiar one: the trials and triumphs of the Apollo 
program, told mainly from the point of view of the astronauts. 
It is worth reading about again in this book, which dramatically 
details the skill, courage, and dedication that made the 1969 
lunar landing possible. In the Shadow of the Moon also offers 
insights that are important to NASA today. We see how 
communication problems and schedule pressures hindered 
learning the lessons of the first spacewalks and contributed 
to the tragedy of the Apollo 1 fire, and how personalities and 
politics influence decisions even when everyone is dedicated to 
the same great goal. We also see vivid examples of the value of 
teamwork and training at NASA. 
Above all, the book reminds us just how extraordinary the 
accomplishments ofApollo were. It was a triumph of technology 
and will and lived up to the stirring words of William Jennings 
Bryan, quoted in the epilogue: "Destiny is not a matter of 
chance. It is a matter of choice. It is not a thing to be waited for; 
it is a thing to be achieved." 
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The Knowledge Noteboo 
The Costs of Knowledge 
BY LAURENCE PRUSAK 
One of the defining features of society and the 
economy at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is the plummeting cost of working with 
information. The IT revolution, which started 
its public life slowly in the mid-1950s, picked up 
tremendous steam in the decades that followed. 
By the end of the century, the cost of accruing 
and distributing information had fallen to levels 
that would have been inconceivable a few dozen 
years earlier. 
A computer scientist I know recently took 
his twelve-year-old son to a baseball game. The 
boy bought a box of candy that contained a little 
"prize"--a very small, cheaply made calculator. 
This boy, who lives with pretty sophisticated 
machinery, disdainfully tossed the toy into the 
nearest trash can. His father retrieved it and 
brought it home to look closely at it. He found 
that this trivial toy had more computing power 
than the largest machines built during the Second 
World War! All that change has happened in my 
own lifetime. The computing power of the mission 
control center that got Apollo to the moon in the 
sixties-a hugely expensive marvel at the time-is 
utterly insignificant today. 
The effect of cheap and seemingly ubiquitous 
computing on the search for and retrieval of 
information is apparent to all. Less obvious is the 
fact that knowledge is not subject to these changes. 
In fact, one can make the case that knowledge 
costs have actually increased over the same period. 
Let's look at why information and knowledge are 
so different in this regard. 
Some recent research I conducted with some 
colleagues divided up the actual activities that 
working with knowledge entails into four discrete 
activities: searching for knowledge, negotiating 
with knowledge sources, adapting and adopting 
new knowledge, and distributing knowledge. All 
these human activities take time and attention. 
While technology can play a role in mitigating their 
costs, knowledge still proves to be an expensive 
item in any organization's budget. 
Searching for knowledge is probably the most 
amenable to some sort of technological assist. 
Virtually everyone uses some sort of search engine, 
often Google, to try to figure out who knows 
something they need to learn about and how to 
contact them. While this isn't a fail-safe process- 
the Web includes a lot of self-promotion and bogus 
information-it is a remarkably efficient way to 
get started. 
But acquiring knowledge-genuinely learning 
something new-requires the consent and 
commitment of the person you're trying to learn 
from. In contrast to information, which can 
usually be effectively transmitted in a document 
or diagram, knowledge comes from explaining, 
clarifying, questioning, and sometimes actually 
working together. Getting this kind of attention 
and commitment often involves some form of 
negotiation, since even the most generous person's 
time and energy are limited. Few experts sit around 
waiting to share their knowledge with strangers or 
casual acquaintances. 
In reasonably collaborative enterprises- 
I think NASA is one-this sort of negotiation 
isn't too onerous. People want to help each 
other and share what they know, so the "cost" of 
acquiring knowledge is relatively low. In many 
organizations (and many communities and 
countries), however, there are considerable costs 
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associated with this activity, and many situations in which j I\] GOT\\ 1 HiiiiST 70 I bj FOC3M/47-IC)Nj 
negotiations fail. 
The greatest knowledge cost is in and adopting ' f i I !  //<>I I CAI\/ USLjAI-I Y BE Lf FkCTIVIki-Y 
knowledge to one's own use. Sometimes this means formally 
organizing what one learns in writing. Sometimes it means ~RANSPL/?i i - i  FrI IN A ii >OClll\Ai N OR 
just taking time to reflect on someone else's thoughts and [)//ii(j[a/!liMii, ;.;iaJ(iv\iik-~](;E COMFS ;:i;loM 
experiences-thinking about knowledge that is not exactly what 
you need but can lead you to develop ideas that will be useful. F XPI / \ I I \ l /  P \ JG  Cl tAWI I Y' NC;, CIL LC-iT' l(3bl1blG 
A long, discursive conversation, with all the back-and-forth 
that defines conversation, can be a mechanism of knowledge ,All\!I'l ~ ~ O ~ ~ L - ~ l ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~  I L X L  I '! VdOI 3KiING 
- 
exchange. I have seen many participants at NASA APPEL 
~ < > < - ~ i :  ~3 
Masters Forums talking, reflecting, and thinking-adapting 
what they are hearing to their own needs. 
Knowledge transfer is not a simple proposition. An enormous 
amount of information flows through the world every day, but 
knowledge is local, contextual, and "stickyn-that is, it takes 
real effort to move it from one place to another. There is no 
way around this. To really learn a subject, you have to work at 
it, you have to pay your "knowledge dues." So while, thanks to 
advances in technology, almost infinite amounts of information 
are instantly available, it still takes the same amount of time and 
work to learn French as it did in the year 1800-or to master 
physics or philosophy. 
The computer on your desk is amazing. So is the Internet. 
They make a lot of things easier. (I wrote this little article on my 
computer and e-mailed it to ASK'S managing editor. Twenty- 
five years ago, I would have had to type it, put it in the mail, 
and wait for handwritten revisions, which would have required 
retyping and re-mailing the whole thing.) New technologies put 
a wealth of information at your fingertips. But don't mistake 
that information for knowledge. Information can fly through 
cyberspace, but knowledge resides in people, practices, and 
work routines. Information is fast and cheap. Knowledge costs 
time and effort. , 
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NASA in the News 
NASA recently launched a Web site that contains survey responses collected from 25,762 air carrier 
pilots and 4,777 general aviation pilots as part of the NASA National Aviation Operational Monitoring 
Service (NAOMS) project, which ran from April 2001 through December 2004. NASA funded NAOMS 
I to investigate new methodologies that may be of use to the broader research community. The study 
I i.,.f focus&-. -n aviation safety, reaching out to pilots for their responses, which would remain anonymous, instead of relying on them to proactively proffer information via other channels, such as the Federal Aviation Administration's Aviation Safety Action Program. NASA Administrator Michael Griffin commented, "Folks were looking to develop a methodology that 
would unearth precursor information, the kinds of data that, after an accident, one looks back and says, 'Oh, I could have 
seen this coming.' That is a goal in all fields of safety." The redacted data, as well as initial methodology analysis and insight I into the process of disaggregating the data, can be found online at http://www.nasa.gov/news/reports/NAOMS.htrnl, 
Get Involved in Space Exploration For More on 
Looking for ways to get your children or students involved in space exploration? NASA offers 
several opportunities for students from kindergarten through college to gain hands-on experience 
Our Stories 
Additional information in the space program, including several competitions-from lunar plant growth to the annual pertaining to articles 
Great Moonbuggy Race. To find out more about the ongoing competitions, seminars, and featured in this issue can 
special programs, visit http://www.nasa.gov/audience/foreducators/index.html. There are also be found by visiting the 
opportunities for professional or amateur astronomers, as well as the general public, to have a following Web sites: 
hand in NASA mission activities, such as the Cassini-Huygens Saturn Observation Campaign: 
http://soc.jpl.nasa.gov/index.cfm. X PRIZE Foundation: 
http://www.xprize.org 
Web of Knowledge Dawn Mission: http:// 
The transfer, application, and commercialization of NASA-funded technology occur in many ways: www.nasa.gov/mission~ 
knowledge sharing, technical assistance, intellectual property licensing, cooperative research and pages/dawn/main/index. 
technology projects, and other forms of partnership. The NASA Innovative Partnerships Program html 
(IPP) directs programs and initiatives to foster technology partnerships, commercialization, and 
innovation in support of NASA's overall mission and national priorities. Their Web site includes Maine Space Grant 
links to other sites operated by NASA's national network of programs, organizations, and Consortium: http://www.msgc.org 
services sponsored by and affiliated with the IPP at NASA Headquarters. These sites explore 
NASA technology and give access to opportunities for technology transfer, development, and 
collaboration with NASA. Also learn how NASA technology has moved into the marketplace and 
contributed to NASA Mission Directorates and the nation's prosperity: http://ipp.nasa.gov. 
I 
We welcome your comments on what you've read in this issue of ASK and your suggestions for articles you 
would like to see in future issues. Share your thoughts with us at http://appel.nasa.gov/ask/about/write.php. I feedback 
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